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INTRODUCTION
Concepts of protest in Africa, like historical concepts elsewhere,
have

undergone considerable change through the last half century, and

it is possible at present to distinguish three schools of thought.
These are the colonialist school, the nationalist, and, for want of a
more specific term, the revisionist.
The first in time, the colonialist, had its roots in the attitudes
of explorers and military corrmanders, then developed through early civil
administrators and settlers, and ultimately was reiterated by biographers,
historians, and Royal Commissions.

In Kenya

for instance, there is

a common i deo 1ogy that runs through the writings of Hall
11 , Mei nertzhagen,
Eliot, Cranborne, Huxley, Leakey and the Corfield Report.

This school

regarded any form of protest as a rebellion against the Europeans' beneficent design to eradicate African primitivism and instill the common
or civil law, orderly government, Christianity, capitalism, and other
aspects of European "civilization. 11
redeeming quality.

Protest thus. was an evil with no

Its motivation stemmed from the selfish ambitions of

chiefs and elders, the machinations of witchdoctors, the innate hostility
or aggressiveness of certain tribes,
11

11

base communal rituals, and from

the general emotionalism and irrationality of a backward people.

Since

protest, in popular definition, connotes the possibility of a legitimate
basis for opposition, the colonialist school avoided the term.

Uprising,

rebellion, revolt, riot, insurrection, disturbance, and, in the extreme,
war were the descriptive words.
Beginning in the late fifties, as it became obvious that Africans
were moving rapidly and irresistibly toward independence, new concepts
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of African protest gained the ascendency.

Their beginnings in East

African , history can be found in the writings of early humanitarians
such as McGregor Ross, Norman Leys, and Leonard Woolf, all of whom found
legitimacy and rationality in much of the Africans' opposition to the
imposition and maintenance of European rule. · To them the evil was inherent
in imperialism and colonialism rather than in the African opposition.
The new concepts that emerged in the fifties and flowered in the sixties
added to these antecedents a glorification of the struggle for independence and the establishment of nationhood.

The word protest was employed
11

11

to describe African opposition in all its varieties from the inception of
the European presence.

The leaders of the new school for East Africa--

Carl Rosberg, Robert Rotberg, and the Dar es Salaam historians led by
Terrence Ranger--tehded to associate all protest with nationalism.

What

Rangercalled "primary and secondary resistance" and Rotberg llresistance
and rebellion" were in. essence what others recognized as
and nationalism."

protonationalism

Not surprisingly these historians collectively were

soon regarded as the nationalist school.
historians,

11

Joined by many young African

who in the chauvinistic climate of new nationhood naturally

concentrated on the winning of independence, this school rolled out publications, dominated the learned journals, monopolized lecture platforms,
and, in short, gained a popular favor no less than that enjoyed in preceding

decades by the colonialist historians.

Within the last few years, mariy young scholars, acting for the most
part independently of one another, have found new reasons to attack the
colonialist concepts and have become sharply critical of the nationalist
school.

Since their ideas have not

coalesced as yet into a central theme,
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they may be described temporarily as merely the revisionist historians.
They perhaps do not yet deserve the designation of a school.

In revising

colonialist interpretations, they have employed the techniques of the
nationalists, i.e., a minute examination of written sources, many of which
were not available in the colonial period, and a pervasive collection of
oral evidence.

In most instances, however, they have sought and inter-

preted this information without the preconceived, ideological theories
and values attributed to the nationalists.

While often adopting nationalist

phraseology such as "primary and secondary resistance, 11 these historians
have developed the new terminology of sub-imperialism, collaboration,
communicators, and modernizers.

Basic to their approach is the rejection

of the thesis of a continuity of opposition through the entire colonial
period and the tie of all protest to nationalism.

They deny that all or

even a significant portion of African protest embodied the cultural cohesiveness, unity of purpose, and specific goals essential to nationalism.
At the same time, however, some have undermined the importance of protest
by suggesting that African collaboration, an opposing theme, is perhaps
even more deserving of consideration.

A few have turned from an emphasis

on Africans to a study of non-European minority communities, such as the
Asians and Arabs, to explore their contributions to the overall history,
including protest.

Like revisionists at any time, these historians in

their entirety have not been popular.

While editorial boards and history

departments are dominated by adherents of the nationalist school, it has
been difficult for them to publish and to hold responsible positions.
Because of the increasing attention given to African protest,
largely through nationalist writings, the Program of Eastern African
Studies at Syracuse University decided to devote its spring seminar in 1971

-iv-

to the subject.

At the suggestion of Alan Smith, the new Assistant Pro-

fessor of African history, papers were solicited from younger scholars
exten-

in the United States, Britain, and Africa who had just completed

sive field research and could be expected to introduce fresh concepts.
The authors were invited to preside over discussions of their papers, and
the sessions were held biweekly.

As the semester progressed, it became

apparent that the papers as a whole were not only innovative and challenging,
but highly critical of the prevailing nationalist themes.

It was a revi-

sionist seminar.
The authors of the three papers presented in this volume were typical.
They had received intensive training in African history at universities
with established African study programs, had lived in Africa for relatively
long periods of time, and had recently returned after independent research
in the field to write dissertations and begin teaching careers.

All were

eager to publish their findings and conclusions of African protest.
Robert M. Maxon, Assistant Professor of History at West Virginia
University, has an unusually broad base for scholarship relative to Kenya.
After a B.A. at Duke University in 1961 and brief enrollments at Columbia
University, the University of London, and Makerere in Kampala, he served
four years as Education Officer for the Government of Kenya

In 1965

he began studies for a Ph.D. in African history at Syracuse University.
While there he directed the teaching of Swahili to Peace Corps trainees
and was a research assistant in the Program of Eastern African Studies.
During 1968-69 Maxon completed in Kenya the field research for his dissertation, "British Rule in Gusiiland, 1907-63,
the Ph.D.

Maxon is a competent scholar.

11

and in 1972 he received

As a graduate student he was

awarded Woodrow Wilson, Fulbright-Hays, and Shell International fellowships.

-vHis publications include four articles on the Gusii, another article on
John Ainsworth, and the book A Guide to the Kenya National Archives, of
which he was co-author.
Painstaking in research, naturally skeptical of others' generalizations, and very independent in his approach, Maxon as an historian tends
to defy classification.

In the following article,

to British Rule, 1905-14,

11

11

Early Gusii Resistance

he shows neither the pro-settler and anti-

resistance views characteristic of colonialist historians, nor the ideological assumptions associated with the nationalists.

Much of his article

is devoted to a correction of statements on Gusii protest by an earlier
historian, Audrey Wipper, whose views on the whole coincide with those of
the colonialist school, and whose research, in Maxon's view, was quite
inadequate.

Instead of Ranger I s II primary resistance, 11 Maxon uses the

phrase "early resistance," and he makes no attempt to tie this incipient
Gusii protest to nationalism.

On the other hand, he does not specifically

dissociate the resistance from a nationalist movement.
tioning the word collaboration,
11

11

Though not men-

he asserts that the Gusii response to

British rule was neither completely hostile, nor completely friendly.

In

these ways Maxon appears simply as a revisionist without the usual pronounced anti-nationalist bias.
deserves some criticism.

Though convincing throughout, Maxon's article

He leaves the impression, especially in view of

Strayer's and Steinhart's detailed analyses, that he should have devoted
less attention to Wipper's mistakes and more to a description of Gusii
motivation.
Robert W. Strayer, Assistant Professor of History at New York State
University College, Brockport, should be considered a leading authority on
mission history in East Africa.

His interest in the subject is long-standing.

-viHe was raised in a Pennsylvania family and environment in which missions
played an important role.

He received a B.A. at Wheaton College in 1964

and an M.A. at the University of Wisconsin in 1966.

The next two years

he and his wife spent in Ethiopia as Peace Corps volunteers, and during
that time they traveled widely in East Africa.

In 1968 Strayer returned

to Wisconsin for predoctoral studies in African history.

The following

year he explored mission archives in Britain and then moved to Kenya for
five months of field research on the history of the Church Missionary Society
Since receiving a Ph.D. in 1971, Strayer has written two articles on missions in Africa and a book-length manuscript on protest in Kenya, all of
which are forthcoming publications.

He now has an award from the SUNY

Research Foundation for the preparation of a second book on the history
of an Anglican mission community in colonial Kenya.
Strayer I s article,

11

Mi ss ions and African Protest: a Case Study from

Kenya, 1875-1935, 11 is more easily identifiable than Maxon's as a revisionist writing.

Strayer may borrow the nationalist phrase "primary resistance"

and agree with John I1iffe 1 s thesis that 11 colonial rule cannot be seen as
a process of European initiative and African response. 11

But he devotes

much detail to the subject of collaboration, which, in his view, is essential to an understanding of the subsequent protest.

He expressly refutes

the nationalist hypothesis that missions were attractive, especially in
the initial stages, only to outcasts, exiles, and old women.

He also

clearly dissociates African protest, at least in the mission sphere, with
nationalism and, to some degree, with anti-colonialism.

Anti-mission pro-

test, he found, was a result of cultural differences and a variety of
political and economic aims very few of which could be associated with
nationalist aspirations.

Strayer's title is misleading since a case study,

in the usual sense, is concerned with one people in a single locality.
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The peoples under his purview range from the coastal Rabai to the highlands Kikuyu, and his article is really a survey over a large area.

But

it is obvious that Strayer has examined a wide range of sources and that
his conclusions are derived from the evidence rather than any preconceived
conceptions.
Edward I. Steinhart is currently Assistant Professor of History at
the University of Texas at Austin.

He did his graduate work at UCLA and

at Northwestern, where he received his Ph.D. in 1971.
of diverse interests.

He is a scholar

His published articles range from discussions of

contemporary student movements i.n South Africa to considerations of the
broad topic of feudalism in Africa.

His main interest, however, remains

the Lacustrine kingdoms of western Uganda. During 1968 and 1969 he worked
in the national archives of Uganda and conducted a series of interviews
in Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole.

At the moment he is revising his doctoral

dissertation, entitled Transiti on In Western Uganda:
11

1891-1901 ,

11

adding additional material, in anticipation of publication.
The title of Steinhart's article,

11

The Nyangire Rebellion of 1907:

Anti-colonial Protest and the Nationalist Myth" is revealing of his professional view.

He is obviously a revisionist.

Unlike Maxon and Strayer,

who were only indirectly critical of the nationalist school, Steinhart
has purposely posed as a chief critic.

His detailed foreword, in which

he distinguishes between colonialist and nationalist interpretations and
expounds the revisionist arguments, marks him as an iconoclast with a
keen perception.

In his description of the 1907 rebellion in Bunyoro,

Steinhart mixes the terminology of the nationalist authors by using, in
one instance, the phrase "primary resistance" and, in another, the words
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"resistance and rebellion."

But he also employs the revisionist termino-

logy of "sub-imperialism," "communicators," and "modernizers" and, like
Strayer, gives great attention to collaboration.
of nationalist ideology.

Throughout he is critical

His description of the Nyangire uprising is

quite detailed, but well balanced, and on the whole his arguments on African protest are revealing and convincing.
Like most cha 11 engi ng and thought provokJ ng writings, Steinhart I s
article .is open to criticism.

In offering new concepts as substitutes for

those in force, there is a tendency to over-generalize, to attribute positions and values to others which are only partly true, and Steinhart, with
some justification, will be vigorously criticized by some adherents of the
nationalist school.

Mo_reover, he apparently was inspired before under-

taking this study by D. Barnett, John Saul, and a few others who have
described peasant unrest as a major cause of African protest, and in his
concluding sentences Steinhart proposes a populist hypothesis as a basis
for further study.

If pursuing this methodology, he may be subject to

the same criticism that he levels at the nationalists, i.e., seeking facts
to justify a theory as distinct from formulating conclusions on the basis
of the evidence.

Though he attempts to thwart this cri ti ci criticism
by ca 11 i ng

for pursuance only of a "myth of populist insurrection, 11 with the implication that it will produce valuable new insights and contribute ultimately
to an objective view of African protest, he is advocating, in fact, what
most historians would not accept, that in research the end can justify
the means.
In presenting these three articles, there has been no attempt by the
editor to impose on the authors a common punctuation, style of writing,
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or footnote citation.

Minor inconsistencies, so far as they could be

ascertained, were eliminated, but with their exception, the articles
have been published in the form in which they were submitted.

Robert G. Gregory
Syracuse University

MISSIONS AND AFRICAN PROTEST:

A CASE STUDY FROM KENYA, 1875 - 1935

Robert W. Strayer
African protest against European mission activity has been generally
studied only at the point of rupture with parent mission bodies leading
to the formation of independent schools and churches.

Yet a recent

examination of independent churches has indicated that such breakaway
groups represented only the tip of an iceberg of African disaffection
w, th m, ss,ons. 1 Furthermore, various types of opposition existed outside as well as within the mission community.

Missions, therefore, have

constituted an important focus of African protest during the colonial
period and afford an opportunity to examine the kind of strains, tensions
and conflicts engendered by a "clash of cultures" under colonial conditions.
The roots of such African opposition date virtually from the inception
of mission activity and derive from a wide variety of sources.

"Primary

resistance" and later movements of political protest were directed on
occasion against missions as well as against the colonial government.
Some of those who initially collaborated with missionaries for their own
economic or political ends later found this association more a liability
than an asset and so came to oppose the missionary presence.

Finally,

many who saw in the mission a means of improvement became disillusioned
11

11

and frustrated with their inability to chart their own course to progress
within the mission community.

While all of these sources of opposition

to missions were conditioned by virtue of occurring within a Europeandominated colonial society, the protests expressing this opposition were
1David Barrett, Schism and Renewal in Africa (Nairobi, 1968), p. 179.
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by no means always
in character.

11

nationalist 11 or even explicitly "anti-colonial"

Rather, groups and individuals responded to the missionary

presence in terms of their own goals and interests and in terms of their
various perceptions of the relationship between missions and colonial
regimes.
To illustrate the nature of anti-mission protest, I have chosen to
examine African responses to the presence of the Anglican Church
Missionary Society (CMS) in central and eastern Kenya until the mid-1930's.

1

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the primary focus of Anglican
efforts was on the coast in the freed slave settlements of Freretown
and Rabai as well as among the Arab, Swahili and Indian communities of
Mombasa.

After 1900 the focus of CMS work shifted steadily to the central

highlands, an area inhabited by the Kikuyu and related peoples and
increasingly subjected to the encroachment of European settlers.

Outside

of these areas, the CMS also established itself among the peoples of the
immediate coastal hinterland, particularly the Giriama, Rabai, and Digo
groups, and in the Taita hills about 100 miles northwest of Mombasa.
Since much anti-mission protest resulted from disillusionment at the
failure or inability of mission agencies to fulfill the roles which Africans
expected of them, it wi 11 be necessary at the outset to examine briefly
the attractions which missions held for a wide variety of African individuals
1 Whileoccasional references · have been made to the female circumc1s1on
crisis of 1929, it will not be treated in detail, partly because it is the
most well-known example of anti-mission protest in Kenya. Also, it is
an extraordinarily complex set of events and could not adequately be
examined within the confines of this paper.
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and groups.

The range

of motives involved in the pattern of African

response to the _CMS makes it necessary to modify the frequently
stated hypothesis that those whose interests were engaged by missions,
particularly in the early days, were merely the deracines of tribal
While mission stations were indeed viewed as refuges
society. 111
by 11 outcasts. . . exiles or-old women, 11 they were al so regarded by
11

others in rather different ways.
The political implications of the missionary presence were doubtless uppermost in the minds of African rulers as they made their initial
contacts with the white strangers.

Those who responded positively to

mission overtures were generally mindful of the missionaries' contacts
with those more powerful forces in the outside -world and hoped to reap
certain advantages for themselves or their communities by establishing
friendly relations with the newcomers.
In the pre-colonial period it was often the influence which
missionaries were believed to have with the Arab authorities in Mombasa
or Zanzibar that provided an early point of contact with coastal peoples.
The Rabai provide a case in point.

The friendly reception accorded to

J. Krapf and J. Rebmann, the two earliest CMS missionaries in East Africa,
by the Rabai in the mid-19th century, owed much to their concern for their
rel ati onshi p with the ru.l ers of Mombasa. In Coupland I s words, they
were 11 too close to Mombasa with its Baluchi garrison to ignore the fact
that Krapf and his colleagues enjoyed the favor and protection of the
1 L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan.

Burden of Empire (New York, 1967), p. 276.

-4Governor."

1

· The Rabai came to view the CMS as a potential intermediary

or broker between themselves and Arab power on the coast.

Thus, in 1879

the elders of Kaya Fimboni in Rabai country begged the mission to send them
a teacher and build them a church.

Many were even willing to discard their

charms to persuade the mission of their sincerity.

It was soon discovered,

however, that their real motive was to get rid of a group of Swahilis
living in their village.
could persuade the Wal i

It was their hope that CMS missionary H.K. Binns
or governor, of Mombasa to oust the intruders.

Binns' response to this situation was typica-1 of much missionary frustrat i on:

I reasoned with the old men · and asked : them how it was
that they never came to me except they were in some
trouble and wanted me to help them out of it, but as
to coming to hear the Gospel preached, they never did
and in times of plenty they hardly ever came near our
village.2
If the initial political relevance of CMS missionaries to African
societies lay in their connections with coastal Arab authorities, the
advent of formal British rule after 1895 meant, of course, that missionaries
were viewed as an integral part of this new political reality.

It should

be remembered that most African societies in Kenya lacked traditionally
sanctioned "chiefs" so that the British were anxious to enlist the cooperation of anyone with a wider than local prominence, however that prominence
had been achieved. 3 A number of such individuals, and some who had simply
1Reginald Coupland, East Africa and Its Invaders (Oxford, 1938), _p. 409.
For a 17th century example of coastal peoples' concern about their political
relationship with Mombasa, see Coupland, pp. 63-65.
2CMS/03, Binns to CMS, August 7, 1879.
3

For a comparison of the type of people among whom the British found their mai n
allies in Kikuyu and Kamba country respectively, see J.F.S. Munro, "The Macha kos.
Kamba under British Rule, 1889-1939." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin
1968, p. 79. He suggests that broker-traders were the most prominent British
allies among the Kamba, while military leaders played this role in Kikuyu society

-5-

ingratiated themselves with the British, seemed to believe that a positive
response to missionaries would serve to solidify their standing with the
colonial authorities.

There were others, however, who apparently saw

less need thus to prove their loyalty owing to a previously established
relationship with the British or to a particularly strong local power
base.
An excellent example of one who initially "collaborated" with both
government and missions was Karuri wa Gakure, who in the decade or so
prior to British conquest had established his prominence in the Murang'a
or Fort Hall district of Kikuyuland through his reputation as an arbitrator, warrior and trader as well as through a short term military
1 This latter connection
alliance with the European trader,John Boyes.
had sufficiently impressed Karuri with the value of cooperation with
the white man that in 1900 he readily entered into an agreement with
the Protectorate officials, which enabled the British to bring Murang'a
under their control largely without the use of punitive expeditions.

Since

the CMS and other missions were attempting to establish themselves in
Kikuyuland at this time, it was not unreasonable for Karuri to pursue a
friendly policy toward them as a means of consolidating his alliance with
the British.

Thus, in September 1901, he invited A. W. McGregor, the first

CMS missionary in Kikuyuland, to visit his residence at Tutho and subsequently provided a number of students for McGregor's school.

A number of

1
university College, Nairobi-Research Project Archives (UCN:RPA), B/2/2(2),
"Biography ofKaruri, 11 by Charles M. Mucaha. Transcript of interviews
also included.
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other aspiring individuals did likewise and in 1908 McGregor baptized
eight young men, a11 of whom had been sent to the mission by 1oca 1 chiefs
11

.

or prominent men.

11

1

There were those, however, who saw the coming of the missionaries
as a potential threat to their already established positions.

Karanja

wa Mariti, who had been station headmaster at Fort Smith in southern
Kikuyuland since 1895, firmly refused to allow the CMS to establish a
station in the immediate vicinity of the fort when approached by McGregor
in 1900. 2 While the reasons for his refusal are not altogether clear,
it is certainly possible that already enjoying the confidence of the
administration, he felt himself in a sufficiently strong position not
to need this additional indication of his loyalty.

Similarly, Gutu

wa Kibetu, the powerful Paramount Chief of Embu, was decidedly reluctant
to see the CMS establish itself in his area, fearing correctly that
missionaries would act as spies for the colonial government.

While he

was unable to prevent the mission from obtaining land in Embu, he did
manage to have them located a considerable distance from his own residence,
unlike Karuri who had invited the CMS to settle at his own headquarters. 3
1 KNA:CMS/1/625, Weithega Log Book; CMS/1908/58, Mombasa Diocesan Magazine,
Apri 1 , 1908.
2 KNA:DC/MKS/1/5/1, Ukamba Province Quarterly and Special Report, December,
1909; Interview with Chief Josiah Njonjo, January 28, 1970.
3 KNA:PC/CP. 1/1, Central Province Political Record Book; PC/CP.1/5/1,
Office of PC, Nyeri to Chief Secretary, January 19, 1917; Daudi Petero,
Jubilee A.C. Kigari and A.C. Kabare (1910-1960), n.d., p. 21.
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If the oresence of missionaries had political implications for
African societies, CMS activity also touched their economic interests
in a variety of ways.

In the pre-colonial period, missionaries were

viewed on occasion by Africans as a potential element in their network
of trading relationships.

Krapf, for example, was warmly welcomed by

Kivoi, a leading Kamba trader, who was engaged in extensive commercial
relations with the coast.

Kivoi told Krapf of his desire to conduct

this trade via the Tana River in order to bypass the peoples of the
coastal hinterland with whom he was competing for direct access to the
markets of Mombasa.

1

He doubtless hoped that Krapf's contacts with

the Governor of Mombasa and with the coastal peoples would further these
commercial interests.

Similar considerations may have motivated the

early receptiveness to mission overtures of certain Miji Kenda peoples,
such as the Rabai mentioned earlier, as well as the Diga and Giriama.
In 1875, for example, CMS missionaries on the coast observed that a group
of Giriama villages north of Rabai were asking for mission teachers
"though

their predominant motive may be (as almost confessed by them-

selves) the desire that traders in cloth, knives, etc., may settle among
them. "2
In other ways as well the mission could serve the economic interests
of African people.

The freed slaves who constituted the bulk of the popu-

lation at Freretown and Rabai saw the mission most fundamentally as a
1
Johann Ludwig Krapf, Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours (Boston, 11
1860), pp. 238-242; John Lamphear, "The Kamba and the orthern Mr1ma Coast,
in Pre-Colonial African Trade by Richard Gray and David Birmingham (London,
1970), pp. 75-102.
2 CMS,
Proceedings, 1874-75, p. 39. For a similar case among the Diga, see CMS,
Extracts of Annual Letters, W. A. Crabtree, October 29, 1892.
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source of economic security.

In the interior, missionaries were

frequently regarded as employers from whom wages were demanded in
return for attendance at school or church.

As will be shown.later,

both of these groups protested vigorously when missionaries were
unwilling or unable to fulfill these roles.
A final economic attraction of missions for Africans can be
summarized in the term "improvement," a theme which emphasizes African
initiative for chanqe and represents a creative accommodation to
colonial rule.

Education was clearly among the most prominent of the

means of improvement since it was a gateway to employment in the new
occupations created by the colonial state and its associated enterprises.

Since education in Kenya was for most of the colonial period

virtually a mission monopoly, a growing number of people came to view
favorably at least a nominal associaiton with the mission.
A major indication of the desire for improvement through education
lay in African insisteijce on ever more and better education.

As early

as 1904, one CMS missionary at Freretown could report that a "keen desire
111 Shortly
for an advanced education is manifested by many of the lads.
before the war, a number of CMS agents petitioned the mission to provide
2
a more advanced education as well as a boarding school for their children.
Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of the spirit of "improvement" lay in the rapid proliferation of outschools or "bush schools,"
which grew up around each of the mission's central stations as well as on
settlers' farms and in urban areas, particularly in the post-World War I
1
cMS, Extracts of Annual Letters, Edwin Luckock, January 4, 1904.
2
cMS/1918/30, Martin to Manley, May 1, 1918.
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For example, the number of outschools around Kabeta station

period.

in southern Kikuyuland rose from three in 1917 to eleven in 1926, while
in Fort Hall District, there were seven CMS outschools in 1920 and twenty
l

only five years 1ater. ·

It is of the utmost ·importance to realize that

this proliferation of outschools was accomplished almost exclusively at
African initiative and represented one of the major achievements of the
"age of

improvement."

Local communities carefully nurtured these in-

stitutions, constructing their buildings first in thatch, then with mud
na 11 y erecting With enormous pride a stone bui 1ding with a
cks, and finally
bricks
tin roof.
While manv Africans had associated themselves with the CMS as a
means of pursuing some positive economic or political goal, others saw
in the mission a means of escape from war, famine, political upheaval,
family problems and increasingly from the demands of a colonial state.
Around the turn of the century, for example, famine drove up to 900
people daily to seek food at Freretown, while some 2,000 settled at
least temporarily near the mission. 2 Likewise, . a large number of runaway
slaves -- 900 by 1888 --

escaped from their Arab or Giriama masters

to seek refuge at Rabai where many of them became assimilated among the
3
The CMS station at Taveta similarly became a haven
mission's adherents.
for political and famine refugees from a wide variety of surrounding
.

c groups.
et hethnic

4

1KNA: KBU/11, 19, Kiamba District Annual , Reports; 1917-18, 1926; . FH/1, 5,
Fort Ha 11 District Annua 1 Reports, 1920-21 , 1925.
2 CMS/1899/90,
91, Binns to Baylis, April 10, 20, 1899.
3
.
CMS/1899/17, Binns to Hardinge, December 7 1898.
4 Tayeta Chronicle, Jan., 1900. A census taken in late 1899 revealed the following
ethnic distribution amonq the settlement's 312 residents: Masai-89; Taveta-72;
Chagga-58; Taita-29; Ugweno-24; Ukamba-21; Kahe-9; others-10.
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With the establishment of British rule and the creation of a
settler-oriented economy, the demand for labor from settlers, chiefs and
the administration itself was the form in which many people experienced
the imposition of the new regime most directly.

Recognized association

with mission schools often served to shield individuals from these
demands as missionaries were frequently able to negotiate arrangements
with local district officers. whereby properly registered students were
excused from most or a11 of these demands. for 1a bor.
ti on, it is not surprising

Given this s i tua-

that a number .of young men viewed the mission

school as a means of escaping the irksome labor demands of their new
rulers.

Government officials frequently complained that they did so with

some. success.

1

During the First World War a large number of young men sought association with mission schools in order to avoid conscription into the
Carrier Corps.

In CMS schools this was reflected in a dramatic jump in

attendance. figures.

Total enrollment grew from 1332 in 1913 to 2267 in

1914, and again to 3304 in 1916.
District Officer who wrote:

2

..

Many observers echoed the G1r1ama

"It is certain that many able-bodied men

have· recently started to read merely to escape from Carrier Corps and
other work. "3
A final cluster of motives that attracted people to the mission
1 KNA:

KBU/7, Daqorett Annual Report, 1915-16; NYI/10, Nyeri Political Records.

2 CMS,
Proceedinos, 1913-14, p. 62; 1914-15, p. xxiii; 1916-17, p. 41.
3
KNA: Coast Province 20/136, Giriama Handing Over Report, May 14, l9l8.
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can be lumped together as religious or personal in nature.

Some

individuals seem to have been attracted simply by curiosity at the
1

novelty of the missionary enterprise.

For others, the techniques of

literacy seemed to · have a supernatural dimension.

Consider Joma

Kenyatta's assertion that "Education, especially reading and writing,
was regarded as the white man's magic and thus young men were very
eager to acquire the new magical power. 11

2

Missionaries did not always

discourage the view of education as maaic.

J. A. Wray, for example,

gave oublic demonstrations of the white man's ability to make paper
talk by writing the name of some object on a piece of paper, following
which one of his students would hand him the object, all without a word.
Wrayobserved that this technique was effective in stimulatirig a desire
tto rea d. . 3

In some areas, missionaries themselves were thought to possess
such supernatural power as to give or withhold rain at will.

When one

missionary asked the Taita oeople near his station in 1907 why they did
not send their children to school, he reported them as replying:

"Yes,

we will all come, if you will give us some rain." 4 Again, missionaries
did not discouraqe the view that rain could be supernaturally influenced,
for they fifmly believed so themselves.

There were many examples of

. .
Taveta Chron, cl e·, October 1899.; CMS/1891 / 54, Stegga 11 to Lang, January 13, 1891 .
2
Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (New York, 1962), p. 262.
3
J. A. Wray, Kenya, Our Newest Colony (London, n.d.), p. 44
.
.
4
CMA, Extracts of Annual Letters, R. A. Maynard, November 30, 1908.

1
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missionaries' prayers for rain and of fluctuations in school and church
attendance on the basis of their successes or failures.
Such, then, were the attractions of the CMS for the African
societies of central and eastern Kenya.

Many, however, perceived the

mission as a threat rather than an opportunity virtually from the beginning of contact.

Others came to such a view only after some experience

with the Anglican missionaries.

Still others sought to modify certain

CMS policies and control mission institutions without altogether breaking
with the mission.

In turning directly to these various manifestations

of African protest, it will be well to distinguish between those expressions of hostility to the CMS which arose outside the mission community
and those forms of antaqoni sm and conflict which were generated within
it.

Althouah these two sources of anti-mission sentiment shared certain

common grievances, the articulation of these grievances remained largely
separate until the late 1920 s.
1

The outbreak of the circumcision crisis

in 1929 represented in certain respects a merging of these two strands
of anti-mission protest, a conjuncture which accounts in part for the
depth and intensity of that controversy.
One of the major external

sources of opposition to the CMS

derived from the elders of African societies and was basically cultural
in nature.

Those who identified with the mission, after all, found them-

selves part of a group which was sharply distinguished from the surrounding society

This differentiation was based largely on a rejection of

certain aspects of their traditional cultures and on .the hostility which
this rejection engendered.

Fundamentally responsible for this situation
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were the missionaries themselves.

Their view of African culture drove

them to demand far-reaching changes in the beliefs and behavior of their
adherents

"So immoral are many of the customs of tribal life,

11

wrote

one Presbyterian missionary, "that he [the African convert] is constrained
to hold a different relationship to his tribe than non-Christians have . . .
They are bound to form in one sense a new community . . . " 1

Missionaries

and their early converts, moreover, frequently inststed on taking the
reliqious offensive against their pagan neighbors, sometimes deliberately
desecrating traditional sacred places.

McGregor himself on occasion

went about with a skull tied on a string, threatening to touch people who
refused to attend church. 2
Two related consequences flowed from such beliefs and actions.

First,

many of those who had associated themselves with the mission, for whatever
reasons, became seriously alienated from their people.

Johana Muturi,

one of the first Christians in the Fort Hall area, observed that in the
early days conversion meant that one was regarded as being "lost. 113 A
CMS missionary noted the same feeling among the Giriama.

"The cry among

these oeople is that if their children become Christians, they are lost
to them. 114 No one has better captured this sense of alienation than James
Naugi in The River Between:
1
Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), Ed.
Questions, April 29, 1912.
2ucN-RPA: D/3/2(2), H.S.K. Mwaniki, "The Impact
CMS, Extracts of Annual Letters, Miss F. Deed,
"History of Weithaga. 11
3 St. Paul's Divinity College, Research Project,
Eliud Kariithi, Auqust, 1965.
4
CMS, Extracts of Annual Letters, Miss F. Deed,

1912-19, CMS answers to Orr's

of British Rule in Embu, 1906-23; 11
Dec. 18, 1905; Matthew Mwangi,
Johana Muturu interviewed by
August, 1904.
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Joshua . . . was then a young man who ran from the
hills and went to live with the white man in the
newly established Mission. He feared the revenge
of the hills; the anger of his friends, betrayed.
In Siriana [Mission] he found a sanctuary and the
white man's power and magic. He learned to read
and write. The new faith worked in him till it came
to possess him wholly. He renounced his tribe's
magic, power and ritual. He turned to and felt
the deep ·presence of the one God. Had he not qiven
the white· man power over all? . . . He realized the
ignorance of his people. He felt the depth of all
the darkness in which they lived.1
Associated with the alienation . of many mission adherents :. was
the hostility of their elders.

Among the Kikuyu it was mission opposi-

tion to both male and female circumcision and the associated initiation
rites that produced the most intense antagonism.

The depth of feeling

that threats to female circumcision in particular produced may be judged
by the following comment:
You white men came among us and we seeing that you were
good men welcomed you with both hands; we readily
do all that you wish us to do . . . But in this matter
of our girls we cannot see eye to eye to you and we
cannot agree to obey you even if you attempt to coerce
us.2
Thouqh missionaries frequently performed circumcision on boys, such an
operation was referred to as a Swahili custom and the practice in no way
satisfied the initiation requirements of the Kikuyu.

So great was the

exasperation of parents that on occasion they used force to remove their
children from the mission.

Around 1913, for example, a number of boys

slightly under the age for circumcision were captured from a CMS station
in Embu and circumcised prematurely to make certain that they would be
1James Ngugi, The River Between, p. 33.
2 PCEA:Nyeri District Counci 1 and Education Cammi ttee, Minutes of Nyeri
Native District Council, June 4, 1921.

properly initiated.
l
captured ones.

Their age group was then called Kimate or the

Such actions may be regarded as "protests of conser-

vation," stimulated by a 11 sense of impending peril 11 to deeply held
2
The focus of these protests was naturally limited
cultural values.
to the area in which the threatened values were practiced and thus may
have strenqthened particularist as opposed to national loyalties.
It would be a mistake to conclude from this that African elders
were totally ooposed to change or completely rejected formal education.
Rather, their hostility grew out of a determination to resist the
wholesale cultural tranformation which the missionaries demanded of
their children.

Consider, for example, the statement made by a group

of Taveta men to the CMS in 1904:

We wish to be tauqht, but we do not wish to be compelled to give up the things we are accustomed to,
such as drinking beer, having several wives and so
on, but to be taught little by little so that afterwards we may come to understand ourselves about
these things.
A similar selectivity informed the attitude of a number of Kikuyu elders
who discussed the status of mission adherents with administrative officials
in 1912.

They stated that they would encourage their children to go to

the mission for education, althouqh they indicated a preference for a
government secular school.

But they absolutely balked when matters touching

1 UCN-RPA: D/3/2(2). H.S.K. Mwaniki, 11 The Impact of British Rule in Embu, 1906-23. 11
2For this concept, see Ali A. Mazrui, 11 Toward a Theory of Protest," in Protest
and Power in Black Africa, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (New York,
1970), p. 1185.
3 CMS,
Proceedinos, 1904, p. 89.
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the integrity of the family were at stake.

In particular, they refused

to consider giving up the children of a Christian widow to her new
husband upon remarriage, an action which would mean the loss of such
children to the family of the dead husband.

1

Thus, when the young men

during the 1920 s and later insisted on separating modern education from
1

the cultural demands of the missionaries, they were in a sense following
in the footsteps of their fathers.
Anti-mission protest was not only cultural but also political in
nature, for missionaries were frequently seen as an integral part of
the European threat to the sovereignty of African communities.

Thus,

the Mazuri rebellion of 1895-96 involved attacks on the CMS center at
Freretown as well as on government posts. 2 The mission, after all, had
been a thorn in the side of slave-owning coastal Arabs for some two
decades through its willingness to harbor runaway slaves. 3 Relations
between the missionaries and the Arabs had often hovered on the brink
of violence so that it was not unreasonable for the Arab rebels to
reqard mission stations as legitimate objects of attack.
A similar situation prevailed during the Giriama rising of 1914
when attacks on CMS stations as well as on mission adherents were an
integral part of this rebellion against British rule.

Furthermore,

preparations for the rising had included an oath to kill anyone wearing
foreign clothes. 4 Such expressions of protest were rooted in a basic
1 KNA:Coast Province 64/252A, Northcote to PC, Fort Hall, n.d.
2 G.H. Munqeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (Oxford, 1966), p. 24.
For a consideration of mission-Arab relations during this period, see Norman R. Bennet
"The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1874-1894," Boston University Papers on
African History, (Boston, 1964).
4 KNA:
Coast Province 5/336, District Commissioner to Acting Provincial Commissioner ,
Mombasa, Sept. 13, 1914; C. Dundas: "Report on the Gi ri ama Rising; Coast Pro vi nee
20/136, Handing Over Report, Nyi ka District, Nov. 13, 1915; G. S. Ngombo, 11 A Report on
Oral Research on the Giriama Rising of 1914, 11 an unpublished paper.
11

-17fact of life which missionaries were not always quick to perceive:
that in colonial situations cultural issues could very readily become
political
i ti ca 1 ones.

A rather different form of political opposition to missions was
exoressed by government appointed chiefs.

Far from wishing the

destruction of the colonial system, such individuals frequently regarded
missionaries as a threat to their position within that system.

While

many chiefs had welcomed missionaries during the period of political
adjustments following the establishment of British rule in their respective
areas, serious antagonisms soon developed in a number of places.

This

hostility was reflected in the chiefs' attempts to limit or retard the
flow of their people to the mission.

Karuri went so far as to prohibit

use of the CMS outschools, while Gutu tried on one occasion to levy
.
f 1nes
on t hose rea 1ng at t hthe mission.

Such developments were not altogether surprising, for the mission,
considered as a separate community of missionaries and African adherents,
had definite political implications.

The presence of a European at the

head of such a community meant that its members had an alternative means
of contact with the colonial administration, particularly on matters
involving quarrels with chiefs.

H. D. Hooper, veteran of ten years

experience in Kikuyuland (1916-26), commented on this problem:
To the mission adherents . . . the missionary .
presented a heaven-s ent opportunity of taking
his case over the heads of chiefs and elders,
since it was logical in his eyes to assume
1cMS/1907/44, Conference Review of 1906; KNA: CMS/1/625, Weithoga Logbook,
November, December 1906, May 1907; KNA: CMS/1/639, Kabare Logbook, July 12,
1915.
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that being of the same race, the missionary's
advocacy would weigh more heavily with the
District Officer than would the chief's allegations . . . The Chiefs, however, came to recognize the insidious threat to their authority
from such means of bypassing their local jurisdiction.
Missionaries, moreover, often reported the chiefs' misdeeds to the
administration.

And in the early days when chiefly power was unchecked

by officially recognized councils of elders or by frequenttouring of
European officials, abuses were common.

Finally, mission students were

being increasingly used by the government as hut and poll
clerks, interpreters and medical agents.

counters,

These people were much less

under the influence of chiefs than his njama or retainers, who had
previously performed such lower level administrative functions.

McGregor

reported in 1912 that his pupils had filled many of these positions in
the Fort Hall district and noted Karuri's displeasure at the sight of
these young men running all over his district with orders from the
government. 2
If chiefs can be regarded as disillusioned political collaborators
with missionar,es, there were also disillusioned economic collaborators,
for the failure or inability of a missionary to perform an expected
economic function could provoke African hostility.

J. A. Wray, founder

of the initially unsuccessful Jaita mission in 1883, quoted the people of
1 CMS,Accession 85, H. D. Hooper typescript, pp. 15-16.
2cMS/1913/16, Annual Letter: A. W. McGregor, December 12, 1912.

-19-

Sagalla as telling him:

"White man, you are living in our country, but

you don't buy our ivory, cattle or slaves; neither do you pay our
children for coming to school.

We feel we are not getting the profit

out of you we had hoped for." 1 At Kigari in Embuland about 50 students
went on strike in 1911, a few days after the opening of the school,when
they discovered that they were not to be paid for thus obliging the Europeans. 2 While missionaries regarded such demands as ludicrous, it was
hardly unreasonable for Africans to view missionaries as employers, since
many of them had been enticed to the mission station with gifts of
beads, cloth, salt, or even money.

Moreover, students were ecnomic assets

to their families who considered it only just to be compensated for the
loss of their children's labor.
In time, these external sources of opposition to missions diminished
in importance.

As the position of government chiefs was increasingly

challenged by the rise of a younger, educated. and politically conscious
element, many chiefs began to view missionaries as "useful allies in
combating a breakdown in their own authority." 3

Furthermore, popular

hostility to missions was tempered as the economic and social rewards
of mission education were perceived.

At the same time, internal conflicts

within the mission community were growing more intense.
expression of this antagonism was the

The most dramatic

female circumcision controveisy

of 1929 in which mission attempts to abolish the Kikuyu practice of
clitoridectomy sparked the formation of many independent schools and churches.
1
J .. A. Wray, Kenya, Our Newest Colony (London, n.d.), p. 26.

2 E.

May Crawford, By the Equator's Snowy Peaks (London, 1913), p. 128.
3 CMS,Accession 85, Hooper typescript.
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It is important to realize, however, that this crisis only revealed
and perhaps intensified, but did not create, European-African conflict
within the mission community.

The history of the CMS suggests, in

fact, that such internal conflicts were present from the very beginning of the mission's work in Kenya.
The source of these internal conflicts must be souqht most
fundamentally in the structure of the CMS community in which an
unequal distribution
of interests.

of power produced an objective incompatibility

It is necessary to stress this point in order to avoid

the impression that such tensions were merely the result of crosscultural misunderstanding.

1

While the "clash of cultures" is certainly

an important element in any explanation of the nature of conflict in
the CMS community, it can be best understood in the political context
of the mission community as well as in that of the larger colonial
society.
Throughout the period under consideration here, African pastors,
teachers, converts and students ·protested their subordination and
powerlessness within the mission community.

Such dissatisfaction was

evident in the earliest of the CMS communities, the freed slave settlements at Freretown and Rabai.

Intimately associated with the founding

of these communities was a group of men known as "Bombay Africans." These
were ex-slaves who had been liberated earlier in the century and had
been settled and educated by the CMS near Bombay.

When Freretown and

1For a view muth along these lines, see T. Price, 11 The Missionary Struggle
with Complexity," Christianity in Tropical Africa, ed. C.G. Baeta (London,
1968), pp. 106-08.
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Rabai were established as freed slave settlements in 1875, the CMS
imported some 150 of these "Bombay Africans" to assist in the work.
Acting as catechists, interpreters, preachers, teachers and artisans,
they were in large measure responsible for the successful establishment
of the settlements.

Yet their own position was ambiguous.

On the one

hand, missionaries regarded them primarily as model citizens of the
settlements, living affirmations of the beneficent results of mission
work and the designated model for the newly freed slaves.

On the

other hand, they considered themselves as co-laborers with the European
missionaries and felt that they had a claim on European recognition
and gratitude.

Based on a premise of equality with the missionaries,

such expectations issued in a kind of racial condescension and stereotyping that was becoming increasingly characteristic of European thought
about Africans in general and educated Africans in particular.
By 1881, an incipient rebellion of at least the better educated
Bombay Africans was in full swing.

In a long memorandum they appealed

over the heads of local missionaries to the Parent Committee in London.

1

After pointing out in detail the work undertaken by themselves, they
summarized:
In short, the work which has already been done here
and what · is being done now by the Europeans are done
thro [sic] the Bombay Africans. For all this why
should the missionaries be ever murmuring against
the Bombay Africans?
The writers of the memorandum proposed that they be either stationed in
a different location under a God-fearing missionary or that they be
completely removed from the mission.

Finally, they stated their refusal

to receive communion from the missionaries until their letter was
answered.
1

CMS/1881/30, Memorandum of Bombay Africans to CMS, February 28, 1881.

-22This memorandum illustrated the nature of their central demand;
if not equality, at least recognition as the valued associates of the
missionaries.

While they wanted to work within the mission system,

they had felt themselves driven almost to the point of rupture.

The

protest of the Bombay Africans brought a quick response from the mission.
A senior official was dispatched to investigate the situation and certain changes in personnel and policy were made.

Yet the problem of

the relationship between the missionaries and their African employees
persisted largely because the structure of the mission community and
the attitudes of European missionaries were not fundamentally altered.
The -Bombay Africans were not alone in expressing their feelings
of deprivation.

The newly freed slaves, who made up the great majority

of the settlements' population, protested their lack of economic
security in a variety of ways.

As early as 1876, some 160 out of 180

members of a class for baptismal candidates boycotted the class in
protest against some of their number having had part of their pay withheld by the CMS due to absence from work.

1

In the mid-1880s when famine

and poor soil combined to render their means of livelihood extremely
vulnerable, they organized to demand that the mission itself provide
them with work. 2 And after the arrival of the British East Africa
Company in 1888, a large number of freed slaves deserted the settlements,
finding employment with the Company a more secure alternative to the precarious existence they led in the mission. 3
1cMS/M4/1876/104, Lamb to Wright, October 9, 1876.
2
CMS/1884/115, Shaw to Lang, November 22, 1884.
3w.s. Price, My Third Campaign in East Africa (London, 1890), pp. 152, 169, 183
CMS/1889/283, Smith to Lang, September 25, 1889.

-23Neither the Bombay Africans nor the freed slaves had any mission
sanctioned channels through which to express their grievances, for prior
to 1900 there were no institutional structures whaiever through which
they could contribute to the formation of mission policy.

Discontent

with this situation led to the creation during the 1890's of an African
Workers Council, a body designed to unite all the educated African
employees of the mission and to express their views on matters concerning
the development of the church.

The mission was suspicious of such an

independent body, fearing that it "threatens to menace the authority of
the mission. 111 It was in part the aggressive activities of this Council
that after 1900 led the mission to create certain institutions of church
government such as Bishop's Locai Councils to deal with matters of
discipline in individual congregations -- and, more impbrtantly, an
African Church Council (Ace); theoretically the beginning of an African
church organization independent of the mission.
Though these institutions gave the appearance of African participation in the ecclesiastical affairs of the mission community, the real_ity
was far from a genuine sharing of power and was perceived as such by
many Africans· invol·ved in these bodies.

dnly six months after the

establishment of the Bishop's Local Council at Rabai, for example, its
members threatened to resign as a group unless they were granted greater
powers. 2 A similar situation was apparent in the African Church 'council.

1cMS/1901/ll8, Burt to Baylis, June 13, 1901; 1901/153, African Workers
Council, n.d.
2 KNA: CMS/1/634, Rabai Logbook, February 6, August 14, 1900.

-24-

"The system works best," instructed the CMS Parent Committee in 1910,
"when the Church Council is always led to realize that it is a subordinate body'' reporting to the mission until the establishment of
1
diocesan authority.
Such policies were in large measure responsible
for a persistent shortage of both clergy' and lay agents in the mission.
By the outbreak of World War I, some forty years after the founding
of Freretown, only three ordained Africans were at work in the mission
and it was openly admitted that young men were decidedly reluctant to ·
come forward for ordination.
While the .pace of ordinations picked up after 1920, particularly
in Kikuyuland, the problem of power remained unsolved.

Perhaps the

best illustration of the conflicts engendered in this way involves
Bishop Heywood's attempt to create an Anglican ecclesiastical province
in East Africa which would have established the Church's autonomy of
Canterbury.

African opposition to this proposal, which played an

important and successful role in preventing its realization, was based
on two related fears:

first, that self-government in the church would

mean oermanent white domination in the church since "we have no Bishops
and Archdeacons of our own co 1our in East Africa. "2 Second, they feared
that ecclesiastical self-government .would encourage political selfqovernment which would likewise be controlled by whites.

These fears

were articuiated in an appeal to the Parent Committee in 1937:
1cMS/Ll0, Baylis to Rogers, October 6, 1910.
2 P. Mbatea to CMS, September, 1937, in CMS, Accession 85, Hooper typescript,
PO. 26-27.
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represented by Europeans, but, although they are
very desirous to help, unfortunately they do not
understand us well. It then becomes evident that
if the Ecclesiastical Province takes place so
early, we Africans will have to be represented in
important meetings of the Church by Europeans who
do not understand us. 1
Africans, therefore, preferred to delay formal ecclesiastical
independence until they were in a position to control the church, and
in a variety of ways they sought to increase the degree of African
oower in mission and church affairs.

Thus, in 1934 the African Church

Council asked for permission. to nominate all candidates for Divinity
School training and requested that certain of the larger mission schools
be placed under African Boards of Managers. 2 They also insisted on
greater authority in financial matters. 3 Local congregations as well
. as . the ACC sought to .maintain control over their own affairs.

Thus,

when the CMS arbitrarily removed two well-liked African agents who
were serving the Mombasa congregation, a "very antagonistic" attitude
was provoked among the church members and the formation of an independent
church was averted only by CMS concessions on the issue. 4
The fundamental cause of African protest within the mission community was the sense of deprivation among Africans arising from European
domination of that community.

Consider the reaction of the African Church

1
'

!bid.
bid
I

2KNA:
3

CMS/1/103, Minutes of Central Council of the ACC, July 30-Aug. 2, 1934.

P. Mbatea to CMS, September, 1937, in CMS, Accession 85, Hooper typescript, p. 27.
4 KNA:CMS/1/599, Hillard to Bishop, Sept. 25, 1933; Hillard to Bishop, Oct. 2,
1933; Hillard to Pitt-Pitts, Oct. 13, 1933; Pitt-Pitts to Hillard, Oct. 16, 1933.
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Council when they discovered that no Africans were included on a
mission committee charged with changing Kikuyu orthography;
. . . may we request that in future when matters
concerned with African peoples comecbefore you,
you consent of your great goodness first of all
to consult with the people concerned in this matter. 1
Very few missionaries perceived the problem of their relations with
Africans in this light.

One of those who did was W. E. Owen, CMS

missionary in western Kenya, who succinctly surrmarized the roots
of conflict in the mission community:
Essentially the African in Kenya desires, passionately,
to be free to manage his own church affairs without
what he thinks is undue interference. He is dragooned
in civil life by alien laws which he is not allowed a
wants to keep that dominance
voice in forming.
out of the church. He
While oower disoarity remained at the heart of internal missionAfrican conflict, particular issues changed over time.

One persistent

area of tension lay in what Africans regarded as mission attempts to
limit their aspirations for social and economic improvement.

African

rejection of these lim1tations led to a prolonged crisis in the mission
at Freretown between 1897 and 1902, characterized by mass resignations
of mission employees and a strike in the Divinity School.

Behind these

expressions of ·protest lay a whole series of grievances by frustrated
African "improvers. 11

In the first place, missionaries were unwilling

to permit Africans personal freedom in matters of dress, a reluctance
which served to maintain the existing distribution of status within

1 KNA: CMS/l/103, Samuel Nguru to Secretary, Kenya Missionary Council, n.d.
2 KNA:CMS/l/104, Owen to Smith, February 4, 1938.
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the settlement.

Teachers were therefore forbidden from wearing

trousers and were required instead to wear the kanzu, a garment which
they detested for its association with Arab or Swahili slave traders.

1

Mission employees were likewise discouraged from building their own
houses or cultivating land to supplement their meager mission salaries. 2
Mission wages were consistently very low relative to prevailing rates
in secular employment, a fact which played an important role in the
resignations of 1897-99. 3 A final grievance lay in mission unwillingness to offer instruction in English, believing that it contributed to
the 11 detribalization of Africans. As late a:s 1919, one missionary
11

could write that "the teaching of English broadcast would, more than
anything else I know of, harm the spiritual life of the African church. 114
Since Africans viewed English as "necessary, nay essential, to one's
future welfare in this Protectorate, 11 they regarded mission reluctance
in this area as having "precluded any idea of our children's advancement.115 The strike in the CMS Divinity School in 1900 was sparked by
the refusal of the principal to teach English or even to address his
students in that language. 6
1
cMS/1891/89, Binns to Lang, Feb. 28, 1891; 1900/119, Peel to Baylis,
Aug. 20, 1900; KNA: CMS/1/634, Rabai Log Book, Feb. 7, 1895; Alfred R.
Tucker, Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa. (London, 1908), I, p. 357.
2cMS/1895/102, Tucker to Baylis, March 4, 1895.
3cMS/l 898/l 84, Minutes of Finance Cammi ttee, Nov. 1 , 1898; 1899/112, Jones to
Baylis, May 9, 1899; 1898/96, Semler to Binns, May 2, 14, 1898; 1898/96,
Deiml Deimler
to Finance Cammi ttee, Apri 1 9, 1898.
4
.
CMS/1919/92, Burns to Britton, Nov. 26, 1919. Other reasons for his
opposition to English teaching included the danger in which such a course
would place white women and girls" as well as 11 the danger of organizing
against the government and Europeans.''
5Jones to Education Commission in British East Africa Protectorate, Evidence of
the Education Commission (Nairobi, 1919).
11

6

CMS/1902/39, Peel to Baylis, January 25, 1902.
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During the post-World War I period, it was primarily the inadequacy
of mission education both in terms of quantity and quality that provoked
the protest of African improvers.

This idea was clearly expressed by

the African Christian Educational Society, an organization which represented African adherents of the CMS and Methodist mission on the coast,
in a statement to the Education Commission of 1919.

The Society argued

that existing schools were:
quite inadequate to train pupils up to anything approaching
a decent standard to start life either in government or
commercial firms and that the present standard is required
to be raised and fully trained teaching staff provided to
cope with any improvements that may be instituted.

They concluded by advocating a system of industrial education, as well
"1
as a "miniature sort of University for the coast.

Mission schools were regarded not only as educationally inadequate
but politically suspect as well.

Harry Thuku, earliest of the modern

nationalists, was reluctant to trust even the best intentioned whites
with the education of his people.

He therefore appealed to Tuskeegee

Institute for "our own man, a skinsman brother" to establish a 11 Tuskeegee
in the African wilds_. 112 Some years later a perceptive CMS , missionary,
Handley Hooper, explained the growing African dissatisfaction with
mission schools by observing that
...
which
which
their
1

it is the desire to control their own destinies
makes them anxious to have an educational system
they imagine will be directed largely according to
own predilections.

Noah Manasseh to Education Commission, in British East Africa Protectorate,
Evidence of Education Commission (Nairobi, 1919).
2Thuku to Secretary, Tuskeegee Institute, Sept. 8, 1921, in K. J. King,"The .
American Background to the Phelps-Stokes Commissions . . . ," Ph.D. D1ssertat1on
University, 1968, Appendix V.
Edinburgh
Edinburgh House Archives, Box 242, Hooper to Oldham, April 11, 1929.
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access to a wider range of modern educational and economic opportunities than missionaries were willing to grant, protests of preservation
or restoration represent an African defense of their traditional
cultures in the face of mission attacks.
Africans within
the mission community as well as those outside it came to resent
mission insistence on their discarding certain basic features of their
customary ways of life.

The persistently high turnover rate among

mission employees, many of whom were dismissed for consulting diviners
or taking a second wife, represented a continuing affirmation of the
strength of indigenous culture.

Moreover, during the 1920's, the theme

of cultural integrity became an important element in Kikuyu nationalist
ideology -- a body of ideas formulated and articulated largely by
mission adherents.

The pages of the Kikuyu journal Muigwithania were

full of exhortations to adhere to or recover a variety of Kikuyu customs.

Consider the fo 11 owing examp 1e.

11

Un 1ess you ho 1d onto the Kikuyu

characteristics at this time, you will become like a little appendage
on a goat, which is neither part of the meat nor of the skin. 111 Mission
attacks on the vitally important custom of female circumcision in 1929
thus met with determined resistance both within and outside the mission
and resulted in many places in a permanent rupture of the mission community.

1Muigwithania, May, 1929.

-30-

A final expression of internal opposition to the CMS was political
in nature, involving the identification of the CMS with the colonial
state.

In certain respects, this identification had served to attract

Africans to the mission, -and missionaries had come to regard themselves
as spokesmen for African interests before the colonial government.
They were officially recognized as such in 1924.

But when, during the

1920's, the focus of African opposition to British rule came to center
on educated mission adherents, missionaries found themselves unable to
speak for their own followers, let alone for African interests generally.
Harry Thuku was both cri ti ca 1 and suspicious of missionaries and is saidd
to have suggested that they were in the pay of settlers.

1

By the end

of the decade, the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), the lineal
descendant of Thuku's abortive movement, forthrightly declared:

"No

European can really and truly represent us.

The only person capable of
representing us really well is a man with a black skin. 112 And in the
early 1930's this distrust of missionary spokesmen, particularly regarding the land question, had penetrated even to the staunch mission
adherents in moderate parties such as the Kikuyu Loyal Patriots and the
Progressive Kikuyu Party.

Together with the KCA, they made clear their

opposition to being represented by missionaries:
. . . we do not want a self-Government to be born
in Kenya because we have no representatives to speak
1Edinburgh House Archives, Box 263, Hooper to Oldham, March 4, 1922.
2Muigwithania, February-March, 1929.
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for us in the . Legislative Council [in] whom
we can fully confide. Those who are considered our pleaders do not help us or speak
for us as they ought.1
Such repudiation of missionary spokesmen (and at the same time of
government appointed chiefs) reflected the rise of a new group of
alternative "communicators, 112 the mission-educated elite, who felt that
they could speak for their people with greater authority and sympathy
than either missionaries or chiefs.

There were, in fact, solid reasons

for their regarding missionaries as "pleaders . . . [who] do not help us."
In the first place, missionaries had been closely associated with the
government's bitterly resented policy of land alienation.

Harry Leakey,

CMS missionary at Kabete, complained that the government had twice used
him to assure the people around his station that no more of their 1and
would be taken, only to prove him a liar on both occasions. 3 Furthermore,
missionaries had been actively involved in the attempt to suppress
African political activity.

McGregor, for example, had helped to collect
sworn affidavits to justify the government in ordering Thuku's arrest. 4

1Presbyterian Church of East Africa, file marked "Political" 1933-, Koinange
Mbiu and J. Kamau to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Octover 13, 1934.
2 J. M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa," Journal of
African History, IX (1968), pp. 119-146. Lonsdale sees the chiefs as the
old communicators of social needs and political ideas whose role was increasingly usurped by missionar,v-educated elites I am arguing that
missionaries had performed similar functions and were being similarly
challenged.
3
CMS/191 l /11 O, Leakey to Baylis, October 6, 1911.
4 KNA:CMS/1/625, Weithaga Logbook, April, 1922.
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John Comely in Embu found himself

"led

by prayer 11 to rule that no

member of the KCA could serve as a church elder.

l

Others attempted

to assert mission influence, if not control, over emerging political
movements by encouraging the formation of rival mission-sponsored
associations.

2

Such actions, and the paternalist assumptions on which

they were based, were largely responsible for this dimension of the
internal opposition to missions.
This consideration of anti-mission protests points to several
cone 1us ions.

Fi rs t, while the roots of African prates t were many and

varied, almost all were conditioned by virtue of occurring within a
colonial situation and were therefore to some extent politicized.
Certain expressions of anti-mission sentiment were directly related
to the political subordination of African communities.

The Mazrui .

rebellion and the Giriama .r ising aimed at sweeping away the colonial
regime and missions along with it.

The Thuku movement and the Kikuyu

Central Association hoped to ameliorate certain aspects of colonial
rule through militant political organization and protest, but found
missions frequently opposed to their tactics and sometimes hand in
glove with the .government.

The anti-missionary attitudes of some

chiefs were no less political in origin though they derived from a
fear that the existence of mission communities headed by Europeans
undermined their own authority.
1 KNA:
CMS/1/637, Embu Logbook, September 1, 1928; July 5, 1929.
2Edinburgh House Archives, Box 236, H. D. Hooper: 11 Development of
Political Self-Consciousness in the Kikuyu Native;" KNA: CMS/1/639,
Kabare Logbook, April 4, 9, 1929.
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Other expressions of protest were less directly political in
nature.

Protests of improvement and those of cultural preservation

were not on the surface of political import.

Yet in a colonial situa-

tion such concerns frequently assumed political overtones.

In the

late 1920 1 s, Joma Kenyatta, - then editor of Muigwithania, observed that
knowledge was the key to rulership in the modern world. 1 Many others
11

11

echoed his belief and feared that mission education was designed to
perpetuate African political as well as economic subordination.
Cultural issues likewise took on political significance as illustrated
in the female circumcision controversy of 1929.

The emotion generated

by this issue was effectively channeled into popular political protest
by the Ki.kuyu Central Association.

In a colonial situation, then, such

issues:
take on the function of signs that are being consciously
utilized to express resistance to a foreign order and to
foreign values as well as to pledge fidelity to their own
system of values.2
A final way in which anti-mission protests were political in character
lay in African rejection of their subordinate role within the mission
itself.

However, this internal political struggle within. the CMS

community paralleled and interpenetrated political events in the larger
society.

In the first place, the establishment of British rule certainly

strengthened the position of missionaries relative to Africans within
the CMS community.

For example, the Bombay African pastor, William Jones,

1Mui gwi thani a, December, 1928-January, 1929; Apri 1 , 1929.
2
Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians (Boston, 1962), p. 156.

-34who had been in charge of the secular as well as religious affairs
of Rabai, was abruptly relieved of much of his authority upon the creation
of the British East Africa Protectorate in 1895 only to be replaced by
a European missionary, A. G. Smith.

It was Jones' very understandable

resentment of such treatment that sparked the 1897 crisis on the coast.
The connection which Africans later made between mission-sponsored ecclesiastical independence and settler-sponsored political self-government,
both of which were rejected on the grounds that they would lead to
permanent white domination, further illustrates the links between internal mission struggles and the politics of a colonial society.
A second major conclusion concerns not the roots or expression
of anti-mission protest, but rather its consequences.

If the colonial

situation influenced the nature of such protests, did this African
opposition have any impact on mission policy or on the development of
mission institutions? While the ability of Africans generally to
significantly influence events in colonial societies was relatively
circumscribed, there were a number of areas in which they 11 retained
some control over their own destinies. 111

The mission community was

one of these, and in a variety of ways African protests helped to shape
the development of the CMS community.
In the first place, the timing of mission expansion and the location
of mission stations was not a matter which Europeans decided on their
own.

The hostility of the coastal Arab community largely prevented the

1J.F.A. Ajayi, 11 Colonialism: An Episode in Africah History, 11 Colonialism in
Africa, 1870-1960, ed. L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan (London, 1969), I, 508.
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CMS from establishing itself among the Giriama until the coming of
the Imperial British East Africa Company neutralized this source of
opposition.

On the other hand, the encouragement of men such as

Karuri facilitated the founding of mission centers in central Kikuyuland and elsewhere.
Beyond this, mission policies on a variety of issues were influenced by African protests.

A s i gni fi cant rise in wages for mission

employees grew directly out of the 1897-1899 crisis at Freretown.
Persistent African demands for more instruction in English were a
1
Finally, the
constant constraint on mission curricular planning.
CMS policy on the circumcision question became progressively more moderate
during the course of the controversy, for missionaries correctly feared
that to do otherwise would result in the permanent rupture of the mission
community.
African pressures also influenced the development of certain
mission institutions.

The establishment of a mission controlled African

Church Council was clearly related to the prior formation of an active,aggressive and independent African Workers Council.

Conversely, African

opposition to the creation of an ecclesiastical province was a major
element in the failure of this scheme.
Lastly, African protest against missions conditioned the development of the CMS community by altering in certain respects the larger
environment within which the missionary enterprise was pursued.

Thus,

African dissatisfaction with mission education and corresponding African
1

See, for example, KNA:

CMS/1/288, Beecher to Smith, August 4, 1936.
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insistence on government schools were important factors in persuading
the government to play a more active role in educational matters.
By 1929, it was admitted that African demands were becoming the
11

1
.
. t he s1tuat1on.
.
.
dom1nat1ng
factor 1n

The need for the administration

to respond positively to these demands substantially undercut the
ability of missions to take initiatives in educational affairs and
was responsible for the defensive character of their relationship with
the government throughout the 1920 1 s and later.

Furthermore, intense

African opposition to mission attempts to abolish the Kikuyu practice
of clitoridectomy made the government exceedingly reluctant to support
2
the missions on this issue. This politically inspired reluctance was
a necessary condition for a relatively successful African defiance of
missions and for the establishment of independent schools and churches.
In many respects, Professor Iliffe's recent analysis of the role
of African initiative in colonial societies is particularly relevant to
mission communities.
African response can no longer be described in the
negative terms of resistance. Attempts to initiate,
accelerate and control change become at least equally
important. Second, and following from this, colonial rule
cannot be seen as a process of European initiative and
African response. Instead, a very complex pattern emerges,
an intera pattern of local initiatives and local bargains,
play between European and African aims . . .
1 Education Department, Annual Report, 1929, p. 8.

211 Legislation to prevent this practice would be most difficult to enforce
and premature action might have the effect of uniting native authorities
against the government in defense of old customs.'' KNA: DC/EBU/8/2,
Watkins to All Senior Commissioners, September 21, 1925.
3John Iliffe, Tanganyika Under German Rule, 1905-1912, (Nairobi, 1969), p. 6-7

-37Thus, European missionaries were perhaps as often responding to
African pressures as they were implementing their own preconceived
ideas and plans.

Conversely, the African response to missions,

both that of "collaboration" and of protest, was neither passive
nor simply reactive, but consisted in a rational pursuit of
particular goals within the confines of externally imposed conditions.
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THE NYANGIRE REBELLION OF 1907:
ANTI-COLONIAL PROTEST AND THE NATIONALIST MYTH
Edward I. Steinhart
The past two decades have seen the rise and triumph of African
nationalism in virtually the whole of the African continent north of
the Zambesi River.

Paralleling this has been the triumph of African

nationalist historiography.

Starting in the early 1960's, an inter-

pretation of the history of modern Africa, which sees nationalism as
a deeply-rooted and powerful force, became a major school
11

historical writing about Africa.

11

of

This "school" has concentrated on

explaining the social and political changes which transformed African
societies during the colonial era, placing heavy emphasis on the continuity of certain pre-colonial African forms and on the role of African
initiative in the transformation.

The culmination of this transformation

was the rush to African independence in the 1950 s and 1960ts led by
1

professedly nationalist parties and movements.

This climactic era

provides the point from which earlier events have been viewed and interpreted by the "nationalist school."
However, after the first flush of nationalist triumph, there has
been a period of stock-taking. 1 Africa south of the Zambesi remains
white-ruled despite nationalist wars of liberation and speeches of
denunciation.

Independent African states have often fallen prey to the

hawks of civil war, military coup and economic and social stagnation.
Is African nationalism proving a weak reed because its roots do not
penetrate so very far into the past?

If nationalism is not the forceful

creature we saw struggling to emerge in the 1950's, perhaps our interpretations of the roots of nationalism in African history need to be
1see I. Wallerstein's personal stock-taking in "Looking Back at African
Independence Ten Years Later, 11 Africa Today, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1971), pp. 2-5.
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re-examined, to say nothing of our interpretation of the nature and
strength of nationalism in contemporary Africa.
This is especially true of the history of early African resistance
and protest movements, which have been a special concern of the
school. 11

11

nationalist

The failure of the nationalist interpretation in the post-

independence era threatens to leave an interpretative void in the growing
scholarship on protest.

In the following essay, I hope to examine some

of the failings of the nationalist interpretation of protest, first by
examining the views of the school and second by a case study in anticolonial protest:

The Nyangire Rebellion of 1907 in Bunyoro, Uganda.

From these I will attempt to suggest a new hypothesis on the nature of
protest in colonial Africa to fill the threatened void.

*

*

*

The announcement of the theme of resistance and protest as a major
concern of African historians 1 came as no surprise and found an immediate
audience and warm response among scholars and the general public.

1970 in

a sense saw the high water mark of the protest theme with the publication
of a massive tome of protest studies edited by Dr. Mazrui and Dr. Rotberg. 2
This volume of diverse studies has ·collected both the nationalist and
what we might call para-nationalist points of view in a collection which
as Mazrui has suggested will be a "primary source of thought and illumination on protest as a social fact in Africa . . .
111

11

3
·

for some time to come.

Introduction to Erner in Themes in African Histor, edited by T.O. Ranger
(Nairobi, East African Pub 1sh1ng House, 1968, xv11-xviii.
11

2R.I. Rotberg and A.A. Mazrui, eds., Protest and Power in Black Africa (New
York, Oxford University Press, 1970).
3 Ibid., p. 1195.
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Nonetheless, even in this recent statement of the literature of protest,
we can discern some discomfort with details of the interpretative
apparatus of the 11 nationalist school."

But, such criticisms as Mazrui

and Rotberg raise are indirect and tangential, leaving the body of nation1
alist thought intact.
A direct challenge to the nationalist literature of protest has
been aimed at the so-called "Dar es Salaam s·chool" by two South African
scholars, Dr. Donald Denoon and Dr. Adam Kuper.

These authors have very

forcefully argued against what they believe to be ideological history,"
11

which

11

has adopted the political philosophy of current African nationalism,

and has used it to inform the study of African history. 2 While I believe
11

their criticism is well aimed, it leaves us asking how distorted is our
view of Afri tan protest and what kind of corrective 1ens, can we apply?
The attack on the 11 Dar es Salaam school 11 has been aimed at
several representatives of that school in a rather ad hominem fashion.

The

targets included those who have worked on subjects other than anti-colonial
protest, such as archaeology and pre-colonial history. 3 In contrast, I
will concentrate on making the argument that a major failing of the "nationalist school'' has been its misinterpretation of anti-colonial manifestations
as nationalist or proto-nationalist in sentiment, while disregarding or
deflating other sources of anti-colonial feeling and ideology.
1Cf, my review in Ufahamu I I, l ,
2o. Denoonand A. Kuper, "Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation, 11
African Affairs Vol. 69, No. 277 (1970), pp. 329-349.
3 Cf.
the attack on A. D. Roberts, ed., Tanzania Before 1900 (Nairobi, East
African Publishing House, 1968) and on A. Temu and I. Kimambo, eds., A
History of Tanzania (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1969). Cf.
Conference
M. Chanock, Development and Change in the History of Malawi,
on the Early History of Malawi, Limbe, 1970, for a general critique of
nationalist historiography in Malawi.
11

11
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What is the view of the "nationalist school" on African protest
movements? The first point to be made is that the nationalist historians
insist upon a continuity of early protest through the colonial period,
a continuity which connects early protest forms with later forms of agitation that we generally accept as mass nationalism.

1

Thus, the roots

of nationalism are placed far in the past, at least coincidental with the
first expressions of protest against colonial overrule.

The emphasis is

on the deepness of the roots of African nations and the growth of popular
participation in movements of protest, which culminated in the organization
and success of nationalist parties and movements. 2 Anti-colonial protest
is thus equated with nascent feelings of nationhood and the creation of
institutions of national scale and identification.

It is this "myth of

nationalism" which has come under attack by both politicians and scholars,
who have upheld the ultimate utility of objective scholarship. 3 While
objective scholarship is readily applauded, it is not in itself a substitute for an interpretation of the nature of protest which can accommodate
the diverse empirical data without theoretical banality.

1 T. 0. Ranger, "Connexions between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern
Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa," Journal of African History,
IX, 3 and 4 (1968), pp. 437-53, 631-41.
2 J. M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa," Journal of
African History IX, l (1968), pp. 119-46; "The Emergence of African Nations,"
in Emerging Themes, T. 0. Ranger, ed., pp. 201-17.
3

Cf. Denoon and Kuper, "Nationalist Historians,"

pp. 346-48.
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There are two basic pitfalls of the nationalist interpretation of
protest.

One has already been anticipated by Dr. Ranger when he briefly

recognized that "African resistance, in the sense of movements similar
to those categorized as 'primary resistance' movements, has taken the form
of protest against dominance or sub-imperialism, by other African peoples. 111
Moreover, Ranger also notes that

11

traditions of resistance can sometimes

be used against nationalist movements as well as _QY them.

11

However,

this somewhat embarrassing fact is dismissed in a call for further investigation of "the whole question of African resistance to African
pressures. 112 The whole question not only deserves investigation, but
it may well require that we rethink the problem of resistance and protest
and its implications for later social and political movements.

If protest

and "primary resistance 11 can and are directed against not only aliens who
have come to dominate, but even against domestic forms of oppression, then
11

11

perhaps protest must be viewed as something other than the expression of
national aspirations for "self-government and self-expression as groups. 11

3

To interpret protest as proto-nationalism when it is recognized to include
protest against non-aliens for reasons which are generated independently
of- - or in hostility to--ideals of national solidarity may be an exercise
in wishful hindsight and historically unjustifiable.

In the case of Nyangire,

incipient Ugandan nationalism seems to me to have played no part in sparking
organized opposition to colonial power. 4 Moreover, while the sub- nationalism
(particularism) of Bunyoro was a potent force, the motive force and cause of
protest feelings is something more subtle still.
l

Ranger, Connexions, I I ,
2 Ibid., p. 638
11

11

p. 639.

3Rotberg and Mazrui, Protest, xvii.
4
contrast the hyper-nationalism of G.N. Uzoigwe, The Kyanyangire, 1907,
University of East Africa Social Science Council Conference, Nairobi, 1969, pp.12970. Uzoigwe explicitly cites the inspiration of Ranger for his own interpretation,
p. 162.
11

11
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There is yet a second pitfall of the "Dar es Salaam school: 11

a

tendency to ignore or misrepresent responses to colonial intrusion which do
not conform to the themes of resistance and protest.

It has been suggested

that the nationalist historians, in their enthusiasm: for "the genuine
importance and formidable energy 111 of the nationalist movements, have
tended to ignore the phenomena of collaboration with the establishment of
colonial overrule.

2

The contention that nationalist historiography ignores primary collaboration, i.e., collaboration with the establishment of colonial regimes
by members of African societies under the pressures of imperial invasion,
must be somewhat refined.

It is, I believe, largely true that the "Dar es

Salaam school'' has systematically avoided considering the role of African
collaboration in the establishment of colonial rule in East and Central
Africa.

This,it might be contended stems from their legitimate concentra-

tion on the important movements of resistance and rebellion which have
taken place, particularly the Maji-Maji uprising studied by Dr. Iliffe and
Dr. Gwassa and the Shona-Ndebele revolt studied by Dr. Ranger. 3 Yet, even
'1

Ranger, ed., Emerging Themes, xxi.
2 E. Steinhart, "Primary Collaboration in Ankole, 11 University of East Africa
Social Science Council Conference, 1968-69, Hi story Papers (Kampala,
Makerere Institute of Social Research, n.d.), pp. 191-97.
3 J.
Iliffe, Tan an ika under German Rule 1905-1912 (Cambridge, University
Press, 1969; J. Iliffe and G. Gwassa, Records of the Maji-Maji U risin ,
Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4 Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1968); J. Iliffe, "The Organization of the Maji-Maji Rebellion,"
Journal of African History VI I I , 3 (1957) , pp. 495-512; G. Gwassa, 11 The
German Intervention and African Resistance in Tanzania," in A. Temu and I.
Kimambo, History of Tanzania (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1969);
T. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-1897 (London, Heinemann, 1967).
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the treatment of defection and submission as aspects of these rebellions
Moreover, except for A. D. Roberts' early
and singular article on Ganda sub-imperialism in Uganda, 1 and despite

seems to have been minimized.

Ranger's call for the investigation of "African resistance to African
pressure,'' there have been rio studies of collaboration or the African
_opposition to collaboration by affiliates of the "Dar school."
But, the major reason that collaboration has appeared as an · ignored
or submerged theme among the nationalist historians has been a tendency to
avoid the use of collaboration as a descriptive term and to completely
eschew the term collaborators for characterizing Africans engaged in
cooperative action with the colonial regimes.

The highly colored and

politiial origins of that term in the European context of non-resistance
to Fascism can be used to justify this systematic avoidance.

But, the

complementary tendency to describe collaboration in the African context as
accommodation or even modernization and to describe the African actors as
modernizers or communicators has served to distort the nature of the
response of collaboration by using terms loaded in an opposite direction.
Instead of the condemnatory term of collaboration with its overtones of moral
corruption and political self-seeking, we are confronted with essentially
laudatory terms which emphasize (not coincidentally) the contribution of the
collaborators to developing the conditions for the emergence of "nationalist
movements."

Dr. Lonsdale's communicators are explicitly the precursors of the

later colonial communicators, the "nationalist elite. 112 And the modernizers
1

A. Roberts, "The Sub-Imperialism of Buganda, 11 Journal of African Hi story II I
3 (1962), pp. 435-50.
2
Lonsdale, "Some Origins," pp. 121 ff. A useful contrast is I. Henderson, "The
Origins of Nationalism in East and Central Africa: the Zambian Case," Journal
of African History XI, 4, (1970), pp. 591-603.
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portrayed as prophets of national independence through selective adaptation.1

Again, "African nationalism and its triumph have cast a long
11

shadow back, darkening our understanding of African behavior in both the
colonial and immediate pre-colonial eras.
To let some light fall upon the nature of African initiatives and
responses in the early colonial context, we will have to develop a far
more subtle understanding of the nature of protest and collaboration than
is allowed if we accept the nationalist contentions about protest as
proto-nationalism and collaboration as modernization.

But, before we can

proceed to suggest a framework for such a new understanding of African
responses, we must attempt to bury the wounded, but still dangerous,
nationalist hypothesis.

In aid of this, we move now to a case study of

a rebellion which fits few of the nationalist criteria for African responses and which may provoke some inkling of a subtler ingredient in the
nature of early colonial protest.

*
11

*

*

The conspiracy had been marked with such able organization and

recusancy for a long period so quietly and persistently sustained as to
stamp it with the suspicion of non-native guidance. 112

So wrote the

British colonial administrator, George Wilson, shortly after the suppression of the Nyangire Rebellion and the arrest of 54 of its African
1"

Modern i s er s i n Afr i ca , 11 Tari kh I , 4 (196 7) .

2Wilson to Elgin, 25 June 1907, E[ntebbe
710/07.

J S[ecretariat] A[rchives] SMP
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leaders.

Wilson's long experience with Nyoro and Uganda politics

makes it difficult to dismiss his suspicions of "outside agitators" as
mere racist and reactionary hallucinations.

Yet there is no evidence

whatsoever to sustain the suspicion that non-Banyoro organized or ·promoted the protest movement against colonial and Baganda overrule.

What

made Wilson suspicious and how in fact was this anti-colonial protest
movement really generated?
In February, 1907, various Nyoro chiefs began to plan to evict
their Ganda co-chiefs from the positions to which they had come in the
1
By March, a public refusal of cooperation drove
previous half decade.
the Baganda from the Nyoro villages to the protection of the British
officials at Hoima, the capital.

Confronted with direct orders to allow

the Baganda chiefs to resettle, the Nyoro chiefs refused pointblank
to reinstate the Baganda.

Nyangire Abaganda, as the manifestation is remem-

bered, means, "I have refused the Baganda. 11

The Nyoro chiefs and their

followers gathered at the capital and persisted in refusing to allow the
Baganda to return to their posts.

Finally, on May 16, 1907, with police

reinforcements on hand and prompted by fears for the safety of the Ganda
chiefs, the decision was taken by Wilson himself to break up the 11 frenzied 11
demonstrations and arrest those chiefs at the capital.

No one was killed

during the "rebellion," "and violence against property was restricted to the
outlying areas where the huts of Ganda chiefs were burned.

A strictly

constitutional agitation by means of civil disobedience aimed at the redress of specific grievances had pushed the colonial administration to the
1For vernacular accounts of the events of the rebellion, see J. Nyakatura,
Abakama ba Bunyoro-Kitara (Canada, St. Justin's Press, 1947), p. 219 and
L.A. Katyanku and S. Bulera Obwomezi Bw' Omukama Duhaga II (Kampala, Eagle
Press, 1950), cyclostyled translation by Andrew Kigere-Kavuma, pp. 18-20.
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point of counter violence.

What were the grievances of the Banyoro

which underlay the protest?
Bunvoro, unlike the three other kingdoms of the Uganda Protectorate,
was a conquered province.

No treaty or agreement regulated or formalized

the relations between the government of Bunyoro and the Protectorate
Government of British officials.

The conquest of Bunyoro was begun in

1891 when Captain Frederick Lugard, acting for the Imperial British East
Africa Company and in alliance with the ruling group in the Buganda kingdom, invaded western Uganda and succeeded in severing Bunyoro's southernmost counties and establishing a puppet regime in what became the Toro
kingdom.

In 1893 a major military campaign was launched against the Mukama

Kabarega by the new Protectorate reg·ime in Buganda.

Acting in the interest

of Buganda's security and with a view to gaining control of the Nile
headwaters, Colonel Colvile, the British commander, succeeded in capturing
Kabarega's capital and establishing a military occupation.

Kabarega was

eventually driven from his kingdom to exile north of the Nile where he
organized and led a guerrilla resistance which ended only with the Mukama's
capture in 1899. 1 It was Uganda's most protracted and heroic resistance
and a likely subject of nationalist mythology and historical -attention.
From 1895 a new regime of collaboration was emerging in the rump of the
Bunyoro kingdom coincident with Kabarega's resistance.

The severance of

Toro in 1891 had been followed by the alienation of large tracts of central
Bunyoro
Bunyoro to Ganda chiefs as a reward for their participation in Bunyoro's
1
see E. Steinhart, "Transition in Western Uganda: 1891-1901," unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, pp. 116-73.
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conquest and in the hopes of settling Buganda's own turbulent religious
situation. 1 Only the northernmost counties of the old kingdom were left
to be administered by Nyoro chiefs.

A young son of Kabarega's was pro-

claimed Mukama by the British authorities in 1898 in the hope of gaining a
semblance of legitimacy for the regime of collaboration.

With Kabarega's

capture and exile in 1899 the path lay open for the de facto elaboration
of a new regime with new personnel under British guidance and protection,
a regime which de jure was a British creation as the victor claiming the
spoils.
The British conviction that the Banyoro were both hostile to progress
and incapable of efficient government led to the introduction of Baganda
chiefs as tutors to the regime of collaboration.

Everywhere in Uganda

"progress" in administration and Christian religion was linked to the
arrival of the agents of Buganda's sub-imperialism.
took a unique and particularly irritating form.

But in Bunyoro it

Not only were vast areas

of Bunyoro territory lying between the two kingdoms simply annexed to
Buganda in the wake of the conquest, but even within the rump of Nyoro
territory Baganda chiefs were set over Banyoro chiefs in order to teach
them the arts of administration,

a la

Buganda.

In 1901, upon petition from the Nyoro chiefs charged with running
the local administration, the Ganda chief, James Miti, was established
as a chief in Bunyoro. 2 Miti and his following had a profound impact
on Nyoro government.

At first, it would appear that these men, particu-

1arly Miti, were well received by the Banyoro, or at 1east by the Nyoro

1A. D. Roberts, "The 'Lost Counties' of Bunyoro, 11 Uganda Journal xxvi, 2,
(1962), pp. 194-99.
2P. Lwanga,
'
Obulamu Bw'omutaka

J.K. Miti Kabazzi (Kampala, Friends Press, n.d. )

and Wilson to Jackson, 14 Aug. 1901, ESA, Al2/l. Ms. translation by Wm. Mukasa,
pp. 1-11.
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political elite.

Miti assisted in drafting a new territorial arrangement

which regularized the chiefly hierarchy and confirmed various Nyoro chiefs
and sub-chiefs in their titles and positions.

This arrangement very much

resembled the division of responsibility enacted by the formal agreements
with Bunyoro's lacustrine neighbors, Ankole and Toro, except for the
absence of landed estates granted to the title holders.

Bunyoro, as a

conquered territory, was not privileged to have chiefly freehold tenure
1
introduced at this point.
However, the chiefs had little room for complaint as it was clear that
they governed at the sufferance of· the colonial authorities.

This was even

true of the Mukama, Kitahimbwa, the son of Kabarega who was enthroned by
British fiat in 1898.

Both Miti and the collaborating chiefs, led by the

Nyoro chief of Bugahya county, Paulo Byabacwezi, found Kitahimbwe difficult
to work with in the governing council.

In 1902 the chiefs petitioned the

colonial regime for his removal and were obliged by the appointment of a
new Mukama, an older son of Kabarega's who became Andereye Duhaga II.
Miti especially was quick to gain the confidence of the new monarch and
become effective ruler of the council and the country.

This in turn led

to increasing numbers of Ganda agents entering service in Bunyoro hoping
2
by that means to advance their careers as colonial administrators.

1see Steinhart, thesis, pp. 192-208.
2Tomkins to Commissioner, 16 Oct. · 1902, ESA Al2/2 and Interviews B/34,
Princess Alexandria Komukyeya, 11 November 1968, and B/3 Martin Mukidi,
13 October 1968.
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As early as June, 1902, the district officer noted

11

the very bad feeling

that exists between the Ynyoro [sic] chiefs, and those who have been brought
1

from Uganda and elsewhere, and put in charge of some of the counties."

While the eruption was still five years away, the roots of the disturbance
in the fears among the Banyoro that their kingdom would be taken from them by
piecemeal annexation or expropriation by Baganda chiefs "as was the case in
Bugangaidzi and Buyaga,

11

the "lost counties," were already evident.

Moreover, the condition of the peasantry in the 11 lost counties II had even
in 1902 become the source of real grievance, with Nyoro cultivators attempting to move from under the Ganda chiefs to escape harsh treatment.

2

Thus,

the basic grievance over the presence of the Ganda chiefs and the treatment
they gave their Nyoro underlings was present virtually from the onset of
Ganda sub-imperialism.
This grievance was intensified by the fears that the Ganda would
eventually take over full authority in Bunyoro.
far fetched as it might appear.

And the notion was not as

As late as December, 1904, the local colonial

official recommended to his superiors "the employment of carefully selected
Waganda as chiefs.
11

It was his contention that in matters of the cultivation

of cash crops in particular that these Baganda· would ''give more favorable
results than are at present obtained by the apathetic, unreliable and
1Tomkins ·to Commissioner 16 June 1902, ESA Al2/2.
2Bagge to Commissioner 16 May 1902, ESA Al2/2 and interview B/10, Metushera
Katuramu, 21 October 1968.
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untrustworthy Wanyoro

11

1

In this fear it is safe to rec_ogni ze a

certain community of interest between the Nyoro chiefs and the Nyoro
cultivators.

bakopi ( common man) was not
Thus, while the i narti cul inarticulate

in the forefront of protest, his· opposition to Ganda overrule can be
seen in the attempted migration from the "lost counties" and in a curious
crisis which developed in 1904.
At that time, a new _district officer took it on his own authority
to cancel the labor services owed to the chiefs by the bakopi as he
felt it interfered with the bakopi cultivation of their own gardens.

There

was an immediate outcry from among the chiefs, including the Mukama Duhaga.
Administrative action was necessary, argued the district officer, as the
"peasantry," who had "become little more than slaves ready to work for the
chiefs when ordered" feared that their complaints would be cause for further
prestations when they came before the governing council dominated as it was
by Miti.

Despite the humanitarian impulse and the recognition of the

legitimacy of some of the bakopi grievances, the labor services were
quickly restored. 2 It was decided to uphold the "properly constituted
authority'' of the chiefs.

Although the chiefs were lacking in education,

113 Some
he said, "the peasantry require discipline in even greater degree.

1Fowler to Wilson, 31 December 1904, ESA Al2/5.
2

Prendergast to Commissioner, n.d., 10 January 1904 and 8 February 1904,
ESA -Al2/5.
3wilson to Commissioner, 10 March 1904, ESA Al2/5. These events are
described as a "rebellion" by Katyanku and Bulera, Obwomezi, p. 18.
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adjustments were suggested such as the keeping of labor rolls by chiefs
and the right of appeal from the council to the local colonial officer,
but I think it can be agreed that "peasant" grievances against chiefly
authority, particularly the authority of the alien chiefs, was a constant
factor underlying the rebellion of 1907.
At the time of the dispute over labor services, the chiefs had intended to petition the colonial authority for salaries and estates like
those obtained by the chiefs of Buganda. The dispute over labor prestations temporarily delayed their appeal. 1 However, by 1905 new arrangements on the rights and responsibilities of chiefs were being made and
were promulgated in 1906 as the System of Chieftaincy in Unyoto, 1906. 2
While the Nyoro chiefs Seem to have been satisfied with the arrangements
at the time, they contained the seeds of some discord. First,
estates were allotted under the new system.

no private

By this time the Nyoro chiefs

were well aware of the differences between themselves and the chiefs of
the neighboring kingdoms, but that did little to soften the resentment.
By late 1906 the Nyoro chiefs had petitioned unsuccessfully for private
1ands.

3

Secondly, there was a marked increase in the territorial authority of
both James Miti and Mika Fataki, a Musoga by birth but allied to the
Ganda influence in Bunyoro.

This too seems to have exacerbated the fears

of the Nyoro chiefs and possibly heightened the incipient rivalry between
Byabacwezi, the leading Nyoro chief, and Miti, the leading alien chief
within the governing iouncil.
1
Wilson to Commissioner 10 May 1904, ESA A12/5.
2unyoro Chiefs, Grant of Estates to, ESA SMP 1019/06, includes the correspondence
of land grants and the text of the System of Chieftaincy in Unyoro, 1906.
3
Minute by H. Bell, 31 October 1906, ESA SMP 1019/06.
11

11
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Indeed, the growth of Miti's direct territorial authority and his
growing influence over the monarch seem to be the main sources of
grievance among the Nyoro ruling elite.

It is this last phenomenon

which, in addition to produci _ng the ri va 1ry between Mi ti and Byabacwezi
as arch-collaborator, seems to have alienated a large number of the Royal
Bito dynasty from the rule of Duhaga.

Criticism of Duhaga for allowing the

Ganda to gain a foothold (although Miti himself was invited to Bunyoro
before Duhaga was made Mukama) and for granting too much power to his
Ganda advisors was a prevalent theme among Duhaga's numerous Bito kinsmen.

How much was sincere objection to Duhaga's failure to exercise

royal authority and how much self-seeking opportunism among potential
candidates for Duhaga's throne is difficult to say.

But there is

evidence to indicate that both forces were at work among the Bito clansmen. 1
To this list of injuries must be added the insult of Ganda cultural
imperialism.

The use of Buganda as the official language of state and

church may have rankled from the onset of Ganda influence.

However, when

the C.M.S. missionary in Bunyoro, A.B. Fisher, wrote a letter to the
missionary in Toro, Henry Maddox, on the subject of encouraging the use of
Luganda, he triggered off more than he knew.

The letter, in arguing for

the retention of Luganda in church affairs, pointed up the growth of
1Interviews B/3, Martin Mukidi, 13 October 1968 and B/24 Z.K. Winyi and
Z. K. Mugenyi, 2 November 1968.
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Ganda influence sponsored by the Ganda chiefs in Bunyoro. 1 Maddox,
a proponent of local language use, particularly in translating the Bible
to make it as widely available as possible to the agricultural
read the letter aloud to the Toro Church Council.

classes,

The council,· composed

of many of the important Toro chiefs, had direct connections to the
Nyoro chiefly hierarchy.

We can assume that word passed very quickly

from the Toro chiefs, who had fought a considerable struggle to secure
both their political and cultural

independence from Buganda, to the Nyoro

chiefs, who were promptea to begin their own struggle to rid themselves
of Ganda influence. 2
Thus, at every level of Bunyoro's political hierarchy -- from the bakopi
peasant cultivators suffering ' under the sting of new taxes and labor prestations through the Nyoro sub-chiefs and chiefs jealous of the growing influence of their Ganda co-chiefs to the royal dynasty itself

grievances

against the colonial system which had introduced the Baganda to Nyoro politics were rampant.

In February, 1907, the rebellion began when the Nyoro

chiefs came forward to express their protest at the unhappy state of
affairs i.n the kingdom.

*

*

*

1Fi sher to Maddox, Chri,stmas 1905, Fi FisherCorrespondence, Mi crofi 1m Makerere
Library.
2
Thanks to Dr. Louise Pirouet for suggesting this interpretation based on her
work in mission history, for the Department of Religions, Makerere University.
See Steinhart, thesis, pp. 103-08 for Taro's cultural resistance.
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The rebellion itself can be said to have begun in early February,
1907, when in the absence of James Miti from the Lukiko or governing
council, a new spirit of protest and defiance arose.
his

II

Miti, through

undue influence over the Mukama and thus over the Luki ko genera 11 y,"

had come to dominate the political life of the court.

1

It is of some

significance that the voice of protest was first raised while he was
away in Buganda.

Suspicion that Miti was recruiting more Baganda for

service in Bunyoro may lie behind the talk of a Baganda conspiracy to oust
the Nyoro title holders. 2 In any case, Miti's absence provided a much
11

desired opportunity to speak out. 11

At this stage, the protest remained

strictly verbal and confined to the Lukiko, but the major themes of the
rebellion were clearly articulated:

anti-alien and anti-authoritarian

feelings began to be voiced.
According to the British officer, Cubitt: 3
. . . the chief reason for this burst of feeling against
the Waganda lies in the fact that the Mukama and chiefs
asked H. E. the Commissioner if they could be given
official and private miles (estates) and the Wanyoro
are afraid that a lot of their land will be handed over
to the Waganda.
1cubitt to Deputy Commissioner, 21 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.
2Nyakatura, Abakama, p. 219.
3

Cubitt to Deputy Commissioner, 21 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.
Interview B/3, Martin Mukidi, 13 October 1968.

Cf.
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While Cubitt tended to dismiss such fears as groundless, the fact that
the leading chiefs, i ncludi_ng the a1i en chiefs 1ed by Mi ti , had petitioned
the government for extensive grants of freehold land late in 1906 provided
a major threat to the Nyoro cultivators and minor chiefs.
to note that Cubitt's report speaks of the protestors as

It would be well
11

Batongole, 11

a Ganda term referring not only to the senior chiefs on the Lukiko, but to
1esser chiefs who, while they were Luki ko counci 1ors, would not have shared
in the distribution of land grants.

If freehold tenure had been intro-

duced at this time as it had been earlier in Buganda, it might well have
created a class of landed oligarchs whose economic control of land and _political power reinforced each other.

This would have created a monopoly of

power from which the Nyoro populace and the minor chiefs would suffer.
Thus, an anti-authoritarian element can be seen in the attempts to thwart
the senior chiefs, including the alien chiefs, from gaining a permanent
foothold in Bunyoro and vastly increasing their power by becoming landlords as well as chiefs.
But, it was the anti-alien theme which came to predominate in Nyoro
motivation.

Miti's position as a Muganda chief focused their anti-authori-

tarian complaints.

Originally, he had been invited to Bunyoro to teach the

Nyoro chiefs how to rule.

In his wake had come an influx of Baganda into

the country, who as friends and followers of Miti had found themselves
comfortable and often lucrative positions in the conquered province.

They

came as petty traders, evangelists, and eventually as minor chiefs and
headmen, bringing with them a cultural arrogance, commercial and religious
attitudes, and a desire for authority which was not calculated to win friends
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among the Nyoro population.

They began turning out the 11 rightful landholders"

and assuming power at a grassroots level.

Another complaint was "that the

Waganda have brought nothing into the country, and that all the profits
that they get they send over to (B)Uganda, thus impoverishing (B)Unyoro
and enriching (B)Uganda . . . 111

It is not difficult to see the formation

of stereotyping of the alien exploiters which preceded the outburst of
feeling against them.

Both elements of anti-Ganda and anti-authoritarian

protest were symbolically united in the protest ·against the twenty or so
Baganda chiefs and in this Miti himself provided a perfect target.
But, the groundswell of resentment against the chiefs was quickly
channeled.

The chief reason for the protest, the fear of land grants,

was reduced to the fear of alienation of land and loss of authority to
the alien intruders.

In this the Nyoro senior chiefs were able to join.

While the minor chiefs started the manifestations, it was the senior chiefs,
Paulo Byabacwezi, Leo Kaboha and Katalikawe, who began to organize the protest
to bring it to the next stage: the explusion of the Ganda chiefs. 2 By
siding with the dissidents, the senior chiefs were able to channel the antiauthoritarian resentment into more narrowly anti-alien protest, which still
struck a responsive chord among the Nyoro populace.

By early March, 1907,

the Baganda were being driven out of the countryside by the threat of
violence from the Nyoro
_capital. 3

11

peasantry and were seeking refuge at Hoima, the
11

The British response to the expulsion of the Baganda was remarkably
unimaginative.

While Cubitt initially felt that the protest might be

l Ibid.
2
Nakiwafu to Jemusi (Miti) Kago, 6 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.
3Fataki to Apolo Kagwa Katikiro, 7 March 1907 (trans.) ESA SMP 267/07.
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viewed · as an opportunity for a11 owing the Nyoro chiefs to govern under
threat that any "regressive movement" would be handled
Baganda back,

1

by

bringing the

Wilson, as Deputy Commissioner, insisted on upholding the

letter of the law.

He advised the district officer

11

to nip in the bud

any attempt to interfere with the scheme of chieftainships proposed by
the Lukiko and confirmed by the Commissioner according to the book pub2

lished . . . 11 in 1906 .

Unhappy with the way Cubitt was handling the

situation, Wilson dispatched another officer, Tomkins, who arrived in
3
early April.
But, Tomkins arrived bearing instructions to strictly
enforce the system of chieftaincy "according to the book. 11

Despite the

statements of Byabacwezi that he and Kaboha had only "signed as they
feared to do otherwise, and the Mukama did what Jamusi [Miti]

told him,
Tomkins was unable to retreat to a flexible solution to the crisis. 4

11

Tomkins called a Baraza of all the senior chiefs and reminded them of
the system of chieftaincy which had been agreed to by the chiefs and the
Protectorate government.

To the Nyoro chiefs' pleas of duress in their

signing the agreement were added the catalogue of complaints against the
the Ganda chiefs and Miti in particular.

Tomkins reported that the ''great

point with the Bunyoro chiefs is that they should be allowed to rule their
own country as the chiefs of Toro, (B)Uganda, Ankole, etc., are allowed to
do. 115

While this was not the great point of the Nyoro populace or of the

1
cubitt to Deputy Commissioner, 21 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.
2
Wilson to Collector, Hoima (telegram) 13 March 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.

3 Tomkins
ns to Deputy Cammi ss ioner ( te 1egram) 7 April 1907 ESASMP 267 /07.
4Tomkins to Deputy Commissioner, 15 April 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.
5

1bid•'

-59lesser chiefs, it was a point which seems to have convinced Tomkins of
the justice of the Nyoro case.
By May there was no longer any time for continued protest.

The

Ganda chiefs had been thoroughly driven out of the country and were waiting
in Hoima to be reinstated.

Some huts had been burned, but no violence

against persons had taken place.

Still Wilson insisted on a hard line and

Eden, the new district officer, called a Baraza and put it to the chiefs:
They must reinstate the Baganda or risk losing their own positions.

Even

if the reinstatement were only temporary, subject to the government's review
of the Nyoro grievances, it was the only term the Protectorate government
would consider.

On May 7 the order to reinstate the Baganda was read to

the assembled chiefs, who refused to cooperate, contending that even if they
were willing the bakopi or 11 peasants 11 could not be persuaded and wanted
the Baganda expelled. l

This the government considered an excuse.

Apparently

the absence of personal violence had convinced them already that this was
a well-organized and controlled demonstration out of keeping with European
stereotypes of African emotionalism and violent tendencies. 2
Two more barazas on the 8th and 9th of May saw the Nyoro chiefs remain
adamant, but calm, in their refusal to allow the Baganda to return to their
villages even on a temporary basis.

On the 9th Eden announced a four-day

ultimatum after which if the Nyoro chiefs persisted in refusing they would
jeopardize their positions.

But, when Wilson's hard line was reiterated

after the four-day grace, the Nyoro chiefs who had been assembled at the
1Eden to Wilson, 11 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Lwanga, Mi ti, pp. 50-51.
2wilson to Spires, 28 May 1907, and Wilson to Elgin, 25 June 1907, ESA SMP
710/07.
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Post Office in Hoima not only refused but did so in loud and "passionate"
terms.

Two days later, May 16, the chiefs were again assembled, again

refused, and this time, following the orders of Deputy Commissioner Wilson,
fifty-four of the assembled rebels were arrested.

This number included

the names of senior and minor chiefs and important personages including
many members of the royal Bito clan. 1
Throughout the disturbances, the Mukama hewed to a neutral line.

He

insisted that he personally did not want the Baganda to leave, but that
his chiefs were the motive force for expulsion.

His failure to assume

leadership in the protest has been laid to a weakness of character and
the influence of his Baganda and missionary advisors.

A more charitable

view sees him in full support of the rebellion, but shrewdly avoiding a
situation which would jeopa.r diz·e his -authority and his throne. 2 In support of this contention, it is not unlikely that the Baganda leadership
in Kampala coveted an even more direct subjugation of Bunyoro and might
well have aimed at placing a member of the Ganda royal family on the Nyoro
throne.

In that light, Duhaga's neutrality may well have served to pre-

serve not only his own position, but it may have saved the Nyoro dynasty
and the peace of the country as well. 3
1Lwanga, Mi ti, pp. 51-52, and Eden to Wilson, 11 May 1907, and Wi 1son to
Elgin, 25 June 1907, ESA SMP 710/07. Cf. Interview B/19, Isaya Bi Bikundi,
30 October 1968. See Uzoigwe, "The Kyanyangire, 1907, pp. 149-59, for a
detailed account of the events.
2
Interviews B/3 Martin Mukidi ., 13 October 1968, and B/34, Princess Alexandria
Komukyeya, 11 November 1968.
3
Ibid., and Katyanku and Bulera, Duhaga, pp. 19-20.
11

-61-

Of the senior chiefs, Byabacwezi, who was considered by Eden as
the ringleader, managed to escape arrest.

In fact, Byabacwezi appears

to have wavered and to have been pushed into

a hard

line position by

his co-chief, Leo Kaboha, and particularly by his sub-chiefs.

Byabacwezi

was prepared to surrender to the British pressure were it not for fear of
loss of popular support.

It was reported that Byabacwezi had verbally

agreed to the ultimatum on the 14th day of May, but on telling his subchiefs this was derided into continued resistance.

It was ''better to suffer

with the rest and have the good opinion of others.

Byabacwezi is said to

have cried and to have decided to be a martyr rather than a turn-coat.

"

It is the crucial role of the sub-chiefs that is deserving of note.
Ibrahim Talyeba, the deputy (mumyoka) sub-chief under Miti, played a
very prominent part in organizing the .disturbances and in persuading
Byabacwezi to persist.

Daudi Bitaluli, the deputy to Byabacwezi, was also
among the leaders arrested. 2 Pressure from the leading sub-chiefs may well
have been motivated by jealousy at the growth of Baganda title.holding
which excluded them from the senior positions. · The large number of Babita
among the sub-chiefs raises the question of the role of dynastic intrigue-,
possibly against Duhaga and favoring a restoration of Kabarega, then in
his eighth year of exile. In any case, it was believed by the -district
officer, Eden, 3 and would appear from the numbers of sub-chiefs arrested,
'

1Haddon to Co 11 ector, Unyoro, 19 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07.
2
Interviews B/44, Yesse T. Kinimi, 3 December 1968, and B/12, Nebayosi
Tibangwa, 22 October 1968. These men are the sons of Talyeba and Bitatuli
respectively
3 Edento Wilson, 11 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07.

l
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that it was the second rank of Nyoro chiefs who initiated, organized and
sustained the constitutional agitation and protest which Wilson could not
believe was of local African authorship.

While the British officials

discounted the allegation by the chiefs that the bakopi were hostile to the
Baganda and would ki 11 them if they returned to the vi villages, the role of
both Bito and cormnoner sub-chiefs in the agitation lends credence to the
contention that popular discontent with the growth of alien influence and
the resulting social uncertainty was a powerful force in sustaining
11

the

rebell ion" by the chiefs.
As a side note, the highly politically conscious nature of the

rebellion as a constitutional protest can be illustrated by a unique
man.euver by the Nyoro chiefs.

During the disturbances envoys were sent to

the neighboring kingdoms of Toro and Ankole and to Busoga and the 11 lost
counties 11 in the hopes of finding allies there who might extend the anti1
Such an attempt
Ganda rebellion throughout the Ganda dominated provinces.
to increase the pressure on the British to remove the Baganda chiefs by
seeking a multi-tribal, albeit single issue, organization shows a political
wi.sdom which we tend to identify with only the more modern of the African
protest

movements.

The agitation for the return of the 1ost counties,
11

11

which .Wilson for one believed was the object of the entire exercJse, spread
to that district and required the presence of a police force under Apolo
Kagwa, _the Prime Minister of Buganda, to insure the "Pax Brittanica."2
1

Isemonger to· Wilson, 18 June 1907, ESA SMP 267 /07. Cf. -Haddon to Co 11 ector,
Unyoro, 19 May 1907, ESA SMP 267/ 07.
2Lwanga, Miti, p. 53. Kagwa before being diverted to the lost counties
to Bunyoro in the company of a Ganda prince lending
had been en route
credibility to the suspicion of a Ganda conspiracy to undermine Nyoro
Cf. Katyanku and Bulera, Duhaga_. o. 19.
sovereignty.
11

11

11

11
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Deputy Commissioner Wilson arrived at Hoima on May 22, 1907, with
police and military reinforcements.

Unhappy at the handling of the dis-

turbances by the locarofficers, he felt that prolonged confrontation
even after the arrest of over fifty agitators might well ·1lead to
violence against the Baganda still at Hoima.
quick finish to the spirit of rebellion.
begun with Wilson presiding. 1

It was his purpose to put a

A new round of barazas was

On the 27th day of May judgment was handed down by ·W1lson.

His

awards reflect his prejudices and the element of necessity in colonial
efforts to secure peaceful subordination.

The four Nyoro senior chiefs

implicated in the rebellion were most unevenly punished. Leo Kaboha was
deposed from. his chieftaincy and exiled to Buganda. 2 Katalikawe was
deposed and forfeited one-third of his land holdings.
one-third of his estates· and two years of tax revenues.
who

Daudi· Katongole lost
3

Byabacwezi,

most of the British believed was the prime mover in the rebellion,

lost a third of his estates and was fined
years.

The fine was later reduced.

500 to be paid within two

Moreover, whatever debts were due to

him from the Protectorate government for a decade of service in establish4
ing the regime of collaboration were considered as wiped out. All in all,
his penalties were -not harsh. · One wonders if leniency flowed from Wilson's
I

mer_ciful qualities and from the recognition of past services or if

it

Lwanga, Mi ti,
- pp. 53-54, and Wi 1son to Elgin, 25 ·June, 1907, -ESA SMP 710/07.
2Wilson, 11 Award, 11 27 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Interviews B/4., Pancras
Kaboha, 25 November 1968 and B/42, William Kaboha, 26 November 1968.
3 Wilson, 11 Award, 11 27 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Interview B/19, Isaya
Bikundi, 30 October 1968.
4 Ibid.

-64-

resulted from a calculated realization of the importance of Byabacwezi
to the functioning of any system of indirect rule and collaboration in
Bunyoro.
All those arrested on Maj 16 when the baraza threatened to erupt
into violence were to be removed to Buganda.

1

Twelve of these fifty-

four were eventually deported from Uganda entirely.

This number included

Leo Kaboha, but was made up essentially of the most vocal agitators among
the sub-chiefs.

It was on these men that the pen a1ti es fell most heavily,

comp 1a i nts being
ng received that their property was being confi seated and
their wives and children were being driven off their estates. 2
A word of sympathy was appended to the Award for the bakopi, whom
Wilson felt had "not been deeply implicated."

Even after the events, a

real is tic assessment of the ro 1e of popular support for the anti -Ganda
and anti-authoritarian movement was not possible for the architects of
British colonial overrule.
preserved.

The myth of a quiescent peasantry had to be

3

The last section of the award reads:

4

The Unyoro chiefs, _who are Baganda, _ar, to be
at once installed by a Government officer with proper
impressiveness and with a fitting force. They will
not be i nsta 11 ed as Baganda but as Unyoro chiefs,
who were removed from their posts in violation of
the law.
1

·.

Ibid., and Manara to Wilson, 7 June 1907, ESA SMP 710/07.
2
Various entries in "Deportation of Unyoro Chiefs, 11 ESA SMP 1367/07.
3 Cf. M. Weisser
sser, persona 1 communication
cation, 24 March 1971, regarding a forthcoming paper on peasant crime in Spain.

4 Wilson, "Award,"

27 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Lwanga, Miti, pp. 54-56.
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The Baganda were indeed restored and in that sense tte rebellion was
a failure and the losses to the Nyoro organizers were suffered for
nought.

The huts of two Ganda chiefs were burned the following year

years.
and tensions continued to be high for several
.
.
.

As a result, no

additional Ganda chiefs were appointed to positions in .Bunyoro and
in favor of Nyoro successors .
those in office were eventually reti retired

1

Thus, a delayed and disguised success did attend this early protest
j

••

•

•

movement against a form of colonial overrule.

Nyangire,

along with

I

Kaberega's guerilla struggle of the previous decade, became a focus
of Nyoro pride in the courage and defiance of their leaders.

But, the

pride of later generations does not establish the proto-

"nationalist"

nationalist motives of the early resisters and orotesters.
"'"=

We must try

to establish the nature of protest-generating sentiments without benefit
of such hindsight and see where such sentiments might lead.

*

*

*

That the Nyangire Rebellion was not proto-nationalist in its
motivation or organization seems evident from the events described.

While

the anti-Ganda strain, which came to dominate the protest mbvement, can be
seen as particularist or
fication.

"tribalist,"

that, too, would be an over-simpli-

Traditional antipathies were certainly present, but to emphasize

them ai the price of ignoring . the real and pressing grievances against
the facts of colonial oppression is to flatten the texture of Nyoro society
2
in transition. The fear of Ganda expropriation of land by the sub-chiefs,
\eakey to Deputy Cormnissioner, 31 January 1908 and 24 April 1908, ESA SMP
C10/08; Eden, "Annual Report for 1911-12,"p. 56, ESA SMP 2135.
2
see Uzoigwe; "The Kyanyangire, 1907, 11 while very richly documented, tends to
treat the anti-alien sentiments and appeal to history as uniform among the
various Nyoro classes, thus homogenizing Nyoro society for national1st purposes.

-66-

the resentment against Ganda office holding by the senior chiefs, and the
beginnings of hostility by the agricultural population against the agents
of "modernization" (i.e., against bureaucratic and capitalist intervention
into
ment.

11

traditional" social and political life) all fed_the p.rotest movePopular anti-authoritarianism and elite fear of social disruption

fused with the protest against alien domination to propel the Nyoro people
toward rebellion.
But, how can a rebe 11 io.n by the Nyoro chiefs be ca 11 ed anti -authori tarian? Here we see the peculiar contradiction of the collaborating
chiefs writ large.

They were under pressure from below to champion the

anti-colonial struggle and countervailing pressure to administer the
colonial state.

These cross pressures were most evident in the arch-

collaborator Byabacwezi's ambivalence toward the struggle.

But, the

contradiction is a1so evidenced by the efforts of the co 11 abor.ati ng Nyoro
leadership to organize and direct the protest not against alien authority
in general but against the Baganda aliens in particular.

By identifying

the exercise of illegitimate authority with the Ganda chiefs, the Nyoro
chiefs were able to appear as the champions of popular anti-colonial sentiment without stirring anti-authoritarian feelings against themselves as
colonial agents.

They were thus able to harness popular revolutionary

impulses to sel selfseeking and parti cul ari st programs which at base contradicted the impulses which propelled them.
If this is our interpretation .of Nyangire, how can we relate it to
other movements of anti-colonial protest or resistance? The answer, I believe, is that we must reinterpret the entire tradition of anti-colonial
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protest from a perspective which allows us to see beyond the

"nationalist"

flowering of later anti -colonial movements to a profounder understanding
of the roots of revolt.
Let me illustrate what must be done with an example ·from late colonial
history . in Kenya..

Two rei nte:r pretati ons of the Mau-Mau, movement Were

pu9 l i shed in the mi d-1960 1 s.

By far the most i nfl u.e nti al is thatt of Rosberg

and Nottingham in their The Myth of "Mau Mau, 11 subtitled "Nationalism" in·
Kenya. 111

Here we have made explicit the nationalist interpretation- of anti-

colonial uprisings.

Mau-M.au is related to the developmentof nationalism

in Kenya right back to the first resistance wars against the British in
2

vaders . .. Thwarted politically, nationalist sentiment .turns violent·, but ·
remains fundamentally nationalist. ·This view, which is
to the previous view of Mau-Mau as

infinitely preferable

tribal atavism and savage frenzy, was

quickly applauded by the nationalist historians of the "Dar es Salaam
School." 3
But, nationalism is not the only interpretation possible, nor, to
my mind, the most useful.
The Myth of "Mau Mau"

The same year which saw the publication of

also saw the -release of Barnett and Njama's Mau-Mau

1c. Rosberg and J. Nottingham, The -Myth of "Mau Mau" (New York, Praeger, 1966).

2 Ibid., pp. 7-16.
3 J.

Lonsdale, . "New Perspectives in Kenya History," African Affairs Vol. 66,
no. 265, pp. 348-53.
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1
1t
1
f rom Within.

As the title indicates, the perspective is what matters.

For Barnett's interpretation of Njama's autobiography emphasized another
element in the rebellion _. Instead of the nationalist 11 communi ca tors" as
the focus of the rebellion, Barnett emphasizes . the peasant partisans, the
actual militants of the forest and mountains.

From that perspective, i.e.,

from the bottom up, the roots of Mau-Mau lie not in nationalist organization
but in the revolutionary, anti-authoritarian impulses of the African
"peasantry." Such a view accords far better with the interpretation of
the Nyangire Rebellion presented here.
Instead of examining anti-colonial resistance, protest and liberation movements through the distorting lens of nationalist mythology, we
must create a better. "myth," one better suited to interpreting the reality
of African protest.

The meaning of nationalism must be stretched too far to
2
accommodate protests such as Nyangire (or Mau Mau).
By focusing on the
leadership, the communicators, be they chiefs or political party leaders,

we have accepted an interpretation of anti-colonialism as "African nationalism,"
a movement to expel the aliens and restore "national" independence.

If

instead we look within the protest movements, at leaders and followers alike,
we are apt to discover that the impulses which the leaders organize and
interpret are profoundly anti-authoritarian and revolutionary rather than
anti-foreign and "nationalist." A "myth of popular insurrection" may

1
o. Barnett and K. Njama, Mau Mau from Within (London, MacGibbon and Kee,
1966).
2Even Thomas Hodgkin's fl flexible
b1e definition
ni ti on seems too broad, to be of much use,
as it covers too many non-national sources of anti-colonial sentiment.
Cf. T. Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York, New York University
Press, 1957), p. 23.
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lead us further and deeper in our understandi_ng of twentiethe th century
movements of prates protest
and liberation than the failing "myth of nationalism
ona 1ism"
l

has brought us. ·

Working out this interpretation in detail is the

arduous task facing historians and students of Africa who have found
nationalism a "false start."

1 For those offended by the advocacy of a substitute "myth" instead of a
call for objectivity, let me first apologize by indicating that the
·concept of it1terpretation can be substituted for that of myth and
second recommend the .chapter on " Myth and Soc, ety 11 in F. Wel bourn and
B. Ogot, A Place to Feel at Home (London, Oxford University Press, 1966)
for an illuminating discussion of the role of myth in African societies
under western impact

-70EARLY GUSII RESISTANCE TO BRITISH RULE, 1905-14
Robert M. Maxon
Three times between 1905 and 1914 the British administration of what is
now Kenya was involved in armed conflict with various sections of the Gusii
people.

Early Gusii resistance to British rule was first of all the result of

some of the Gusii's

attempting to stop British penetration of their home-

land and the seizure of their herds in 1905.

Some of these Gusii continued

to resist British rule even after the establishment of an administrative
post in Gusiiland.

Their refusal to reconcile themselves to the new order

led to the spearing of a British official and a second sharp encounter with
European military might in 1908.

Although they had suffered two defeats

at the hands of the British, many of the Gusii still were not resigned to
European rule.

This was demonstrated by the fact that when a convenient

circumstance presented itself in 1914, they launched an attack on the British
administrative center in Gusiiland.
The military and punitive action which took place in response to Gusii
resistance has been described in a variety of works, scholarly and nonscholarly.1

These works have tended to view the resistance as having religious

and/or emotional causes and therefore not being completely capable of rational
explanation.

Nevertheless, an analysis of the factors motivati.ng opposition

indicates that in each instance Gusii resistance was motivated by real grievances and was marked by a general desire to escape the imposition of British
rule and its new system .of authority.
The Gusii, who inhabit the highlands of southwestern Kenya just adjacent to Lake Victoria, were little affected by the advent of British

1 G.H.Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (Oxford 1966); W. Robert Foran,
A Cuckoo in Ken a (London, 1936); H. Moyse-Bartlett, The Kings African Rifles
( Aldershot, 1956 ; Audrey Wipper, 11 The Gusii Rebels," in Robert I. Rotberg
and Ali Mazrui, eds., Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York, 1970).
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influence and colonial rule in East Africa down to the first decade of
the twentieth century.

Because the area in which they lived lay rela-

tively far away from the caravan route to Uganda and later railway to
Lake Victoria, neither the officials of the Imperial British East Africa
Company nor of the Uganda Protectorate paid much attention to the Gusii. 1
The closest administrative post to the Gusii was located at Kisumu.

How-

ever, no attempts were made to contact the Gusii or to bring them under
British administration.

That the British knew anything at all about

them was due to Gusii rather than British initiative.
According to at least one anthropologist, the Gusii were divided
among seven tribes.

Used in this sense, the term refers to the largest

sub-divisi-0n recognized within Gusii society.

In LeVine's words:

Each tribe . . . far from being a unified political
group was an alliance of the patrilineal clans in a
defined area which recognized a common ancestor and
totem animal distinct from other tribes and which
acknowledged the possibility of compensation for
homocide within the alliance.2
In each unit, a common tradition was also a determinant of tribal identity.
Prominent elders of the Mogusero, one of the Gusii
initiators of contact with the British.
British for aid.

tribes, 11 were the

These elders sent appeals to the

Several factors seem to have been involved in stimulating

the Mogusero elders to seek out the British.
of all the Gusii

11

11

tribes. 11

The Mogusero were the smallest

Secondly, they occupied a tenuous position be-

tween the Nilotic-speaking Luo, who inhabited the lowlands closer to the
1Gusiiland is the term used in this paper to describe the area inhabited by
the Gusii who were usually referred to as the Kisii by Europeans during the
colonial period.
2Robert A. LeVine and Barbara B. LeVine, Nyansongo: A Gusii Community in
Kenya (New York, 1966), pp. 3-4.
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lake and the Getutu, the largest and most powerful Gusii tribe. , Around the
turn of the century, Getutu . attacks on the Mogusero became i ncreasi·ngly
severe.

Their numbers reduced and scattered for protection among the Luo

and in other parts of Gusiiland, the Mogusero became quite desperate.
Because of their p1i ght, they decided . to send envoys to Ki sumu.

Under the

leadership of a prominent elder named Ombati, the mission sought British
assistance against the enemies of Mogusero. 1
A1though no he 1p of the kind desired by the Mogusero was .o ffered by
the British, both sides made valuable alliances for the future.

Ombati

proved most useful when the British later decided to establish themselves
in Gusiiland, serving as guide and interpreter to the 1905 military expedition and keeping his people friendly toward the British until after
colonial rule had been established.

Alliance with the British, obviously

the most powerful ingredient in the affairs of western Kenya at the turn
of the century, seemed to offer the only chance of survival for the
Mogusero.

British military strength thus attracted the Mogusero, and

as a result of British aid and favor, the small tribe was able to maintain
an independent existence.
Although Gusiiland officially became part of the East African protectorate in 1902, its transfer from Uganda's Eastern province did not
result in the beginning of British rule over the Gusii.

No immediate steps

were taken to bring the Gusii under European control, but their neighbors
to the east, the Kipsigis, and to the west, the Luo, were brought under
British rule with the establishment of administrative stations in 1902
1 .

C. W. Hobley, Eastern Uganda: An Ethnological Survey (London, 1902),
p. 51.
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to make contact with the Gusii and actually to visit Gusiiland.
The first officials to attempt to enter Gusiiland and make contact
H. B. Partinoton, the officer

with the Gusii met with varying responses.

He was

in charge of Kericho, visited the North Mogirango in late 1904.
''

received in friendly fashion by the people of the area as one of the most
wealthy and influential men of North Mogirango, Ndubi, had visited Kericho
on more than one occasion. 2 In contrast to this amicable reception, the
attempt of another official, F. W. Isaac, to enter Getutu in early 1905
was rendered "impossible by the defiant attitude of the Getutu. 3
11

These differing responses to British penetration were to be typical
of the Gusii response to the establishment of colonial rule.
as a whole never put up a united front.

The people

This was reflective of the fact

that the Gusii had no centralized relations between various tribes and
clans.

Even within the individual tribes, there were normally no per-

manent political institutions where decisions affecting the entire unit
were made.

In the course of the nineteenth century, moreover, the Gusii

undertook united military action on only one occasion -- a great battle
with the Kipsigis in the 1890's.

Hostility and open fighting involving

4
the various Gusii tribes and clans were not uncommon in precolonial times.
1 Mungeam, p. 95 and G. A.S. Northcote, History of the District, Kenya
National Archives (hereafter KNA): DC/KSI/3/4.
2G.A.S. Northcote, The Kisii, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2 and H.B. Partington, "Some
Notes on the Kisii People,"East African Ouarterly, II, No. 4 (1905), 275.
3 Northcote, The Kisii.
4Interview, P. Omwenga, 25 May 1969 and M. Oongo, 2 July 1969. According
to Middleton and Tait, fighting among lineage groups ·is quite typical of
peoples with no centralized political institutions. John Middleton and
David Tait, eds., Tribes Without Rulers (New York, 1970), op. 19-22.
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A realization that the response of the Gusii to British rule was not completely

friendly or completely hostile is essential in understanding the

nature of early Gusii resistance to 'British rule.
Although the years 1902-1905 brought about closer contact between the
Gusii and the British, it was Gusii relations with the Luo which were the
most important

cause of the hostilities which were to erupt in 1905.

The

Luo had previously been brought under British protection . . By early 1905
Gusi i attacks and cattle raids, especially by the Getutu and Nchari, on
the Luo-inhabited areas to the west of Gusiiland had become a problem
that the administration could not ignore.

According to G.A.S Northcote, 1

Assistant Collector in charge of Karungu from October 1904 to September
1906, the Gusii were "daily raiding the Kavirondo [Luo] along their
borders arid had terrorized their western neighbors." 2 The British could
not ignore attacks on people who were, however tenuously, under their administration and pr6tection.

It was obvious that the raids could not be

stopped nor compensation gained for the Luo without the use of armed forces.
Thus Gusii relations

with their Luo neighbors were the crucial factor in
.

.

influencing the government of the East African Protectorate to dispatch a
punitive force against Gusiiland which produced the first instance of armed
conflict between the Gusii and the Bri.tish.
A punitive expedition, besides serving its essential prupose, was
deemed useful in British eyes as a spri ngbdard for the fulfillment of a
long standing official ambition to establish administration over the Gusii.
1 An
Oxford graduate, Northcote joined the Colonial Service in 1904. He
served in Kenya until after World War I and eventually rose in the Colonial
Service to become Governor of Hong Kong.
2 Northcote, The Kisii.
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Both Sir Charles Eliot1 and his successor, Sir Donald Stewart, wished to
see the Gusii brought under British rule.

The latter also saw the area

inhabited by the Gusii as a potential area for European settlement.

Fol-

lowing the dispatch of a punitive expedition against the Sotik living to
the east of Gusiiland in June 1905, Stewart wrote to the Colonial Office
of his intentions:
After the Sotik have been brought to reason, I hope the
Kisii will give no trouble. It is most important to open
this part of the Protectorate which is well adapted for
European settlement . . . some of the Kisii are friendly
and want us to establish a Government post in their country, but a large portion of this tribe is inimical and
will be likely to give trouble. I have however great
hopes that the punishment of the Sotik will bring them
to reason.2
It was thus with more than one motive in mind that a mi 1itary patro 1
.

'

was dispatched against the Gusii in September 1905. The officially stated
objects of the patrol were ''to obtain compensation for the murdered
Kavirondo, if possible fine the culprits and select a suitable site for
a new stati_on in Kisii country. 3 The patrol consisted of one hundred men
11

of V Compa_ny of the 3rd King's African Rifles (KAR) stationed at Kericho.
Captain E. V. Jenkins was selected to command the force and Northcote was
named to accompany the patrol as Chief Political Officer. 4 .. Fifty police
from Kisumu were also

assigned to the patrol.

1 SirCharles Eliot, East Africa Protectorate (New York, 1966), p. 194.
2Stewart to Lyttleton, 8 June 1905, C.A. 533/2.
3 J.D. Mackay,. I nte 11 i gence Report of 3rd Batta 1ion KAR for September 1905,
enclosure in Jackson to Lyttleton, 19 September 1905, C.0. 534/1.
4 Ibid.
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The forces of the South Mogirango, ,Nchari, and Getutu "tribes" were
involved in resisting the encroachment of the British.

Since these· groups

as yet had not submitted to alien authority, this movement cannot be seen
as a revolt against British rule.

Rather, the opposition that the patrol

encountered was self defense in response to the -aggression of the invadinq
force 1
Throughout the first two weeks it spent in Gusi.i 1and, the patrol sought
principally to collect cattle as fines for transgressions of the Gusii into
Luo territory.

When the cattle were not given over, as was almost always

the case, forcible means of collection were resorted to.

Individuals and

groups of Gusii defended their homes and flocks against British attack,
· but the superior weapons of the patrol overcame this resistance and large
numbers of cattle were captured in South Mogirango, Nchari and in western
Getutu.
An a11 i ance between Ombati of Mogusero and the British was a cruci a1
factor in determining the nature of the conflict.
the British patrol as an interpreter.

Ombati had accompanied

He used this position to pay off

old scores with the Mariba clan of Nchari for the refusal of one of them ·
to pay dowry for his sister.

He also took revenge on the western Getutu,

1
Most notable T. 0. Ranger, "Connexions Between 'Primary Resistance' Movements
and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa: II." Journal of
African History, IX, No. 4 ( 1968) , 632 and Wi pper p. 380. The 1a tter source
adopts this tenni no 1ogy from W. · Robert Foran. Writing in 1935, Foran' s
account of the 1905 fighting, which Dr. Wipper accepts as completely factual
and quotes from at length, contains a large amount of inaccuracy. The best
example of this is her assertion that he took part as the leader of a detachment of 100 police. Foran, p. 177. The official report filed by the commanding officer just after the completion of the patrol indicates that the
police contingent accompanying it only numbered 50 and that Foran was definitely not in command. E. V. Jenkins· , General Report on the Kisii Patrol,
enclosure in Jackson to Elgin, 9 ·December 1905, C. 0. 534/1.
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who were the worst enemies of the Mogusero.l

Consequently, due to

Ombati's influence, the most severe fightinq took place with the
western Getutu and the Nchari

In Nchari sixty-seven people were

killed, while the hostilities in Getutu resulted in another sixty
deaths. 2 The fact that there were no casualties on the British side
attested to the one-sided nature of the battles.
The patrol left behind a legacy of ill feeling which continued to
be remembered long after its departure from Gusiiland.

The casualties,

the loss of cattle, and the burning of homes were especially remembered
by the Getutu of the areas affected by the fiqhtinq.

These grievances, as

well as the association of the British with Ombati, were sources of bitterness and antagonism against the British and the Mogusero even after the
establishment of administration in other parts of Gusiiland.

Although the

patrol had inflicted relatively severe punishment, it had not broken the
spirit of most men in western Getutu, nor made them anxious to accept
British rule. 3
Because of the absence of available British personnel, it was not
until 1907 that a site for the construction of a government station was
selected. 4 The station, to be known as Kisii, was located in Getembe,
which bordered on the territories of Getutu, Nyaribari, and Nchari. 5
1 Interview: Andrew -Mokaya, 4 July 1969; Mzee Ongaro, 2 July 1969.
2 Jenkins, General Report on the Kisii Patrol.
3 Interview: Mzee Ongaro, 26 May 1969; _Petta Omwenga, 25 May 1969.
4 Report of the Province of Kisumu for Year 1905-06, KNA PC/NZA/1/1.
5 It is perhaps worth noting at this point that Kisii was not, as Dr. Wipper
claims, situated in the middle of Getutu location. Nor was the site of Kisii
·near the homeland of the Bogonko ''clan'' to whom she gives exaggerated importance in future resistance to British rule. The Boqonko lived on the Manga
escarpment rising to the east of Kisii. Travel between this area was not easy,
and for this reason British contact with the Bogonko was not great. Wipper, p. 385
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Northcote was put in charge of the Kisii station.

In May 1907 he began

to construct permanent buildings, thus signaling the establishment of
British rule in Gusiiland. 1
Northcote was moderately successful in making his influence felt among
many of the Gus ii tribes.· He succeeded in se 1ecti nq and apooi nti ng chiefs
and headmen, and in encouraging men to bring disputes before the administration for settlement to him.

Both the hostility of the people and the large

population of Getutu made it a difficult area to administer.

Although

Northcote had succeeded in appointing chiefs for all other tribes by the
end of 1907, he had only been able to install a few headmen among the
Getutu.2 Thus, the Getutu were the only 11 tribe 11 over which a British
appointed chief had not been placed.

Moreover, almost no one from western

Getutu brought their disputes to Northcote for settlement.
Northcote's arbitrary rule did nothing to convince the Getutu that
there were advantages in submittin9 to the British.

In gathering building

materials and supplies for the men at work in constructing the station,
Northcote often resorted to force when sufficient supplies were not immediately available through sale or barter. 3 Despite the fact that the
grain and animals were later paid for, the effect of the use of such
· force· served only to further alienate and estrange large sections of the
Getutu.
1Diary of G.A.S. Northcote (hereafter referred to as Northcote's 'Diary)
24 May 1907, KNA: DC/KS I /4/1 .
2 Ibid., 11 and 12 June 1907.
3 In June 1907, for example, Northcote went into Getutu and took grain,
goats, and sheep by force after his orders for meat and grain to be
brought into the station had produced no results. Ibid., 6 and 8 June 1907.
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Thus, unlike the other Gusii
never accepted British rule.

11

tribes 11 some sections of the Getutu

This was especially true of the Bogeka

section which refused to co-operate with the European intruder.

The

inhabitants of Bogeka had been relatively hard hit by the patrol of
1905.

It also bordered on Mogusero, and the people of Bogeka disliked

British connections wtth Ombati.

On hearing complaints in June 1907

from Luo living adjacent to Bogeka, Northcote went to the area, but
he found the local elders were unwilling to meet him.

Though he

threatened them with reprisals, the inhabitants of the region did not
bring in the cattle they were alleged to have stolen from the Luo or
the fine levied by Northcote for the killing of two Luo men. 1
Since the Bogeka were unwilling to concede that the British administrator had the right to command, Northcote decided to rely on more forceful measures.

Faced with the problem of further cattle thefts in this

area, he sent out thirty-five policemen to recover the stolen cattle.
The police were attacked and they killed at least four of the attackers
before returning to Kisii. 2 Although Northcote kept only sixty-five head
of cattle and returned the rest, this incident did not do much to endear
the British presence in Gusiiland to these Getutu.
At this juncture, many of the Bogeka began to look to religious forces,
and more .specifically, to the teaching of a prophetess for inspiration.

The

prophet tradition among the Getutu was not a new phenomenon created by the
arrival of the foreigners.

In the years immediately preceding the coming

of the British, for example, the great prophet Zakaw had wielded
1
Ibid., 8 June 1907.
2 Ibid., 26 July 19071
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Generally conceded to

important· influence and authority in the area.

have supernatural powers, he had been the main instigator of Getutu campaigns against the Mogusero.

Thus, Gusii social structure already pos-

sessed an institution which could becalled
against the British. 1

upon to lead resistance

Bogeka grievances against the British, therefore, found articulation
in the person of the influential prophetess, Muraa.

She had spoken out

against the intrusion of the British from the moment that they had first
set foot in Gusiiland.

According to elderly Getutu who remember her,

she continuously agitated against British presence in Kisii.

A constant

theme was to denigrate the valor of young men who seemed to be afraid of
a single white man.
administration.

For Muraa amd many other Getutu, Northcote was the

His elimination would thus have seemed to them to have

meant an end to the alien occupation of Gusiiland.
Northcote was not unaware of the ability of Muraa to strengthen and
influence resistance in Bogeka and vicinity.

In November 1907 hear-

rested her following a struggle in which one man was wounded.

After hold-

ing a large baraza (public discussion) with prominent elders in the area,
the Assistant District Commissioner felt that the people of the region
2
had seen reason and would be more 'friendly to the administration.
This, however, was not to be the case.

By January of the fo 11 owing

year, further trouble had developed in the area.

In December of 1907

the Assistant District Commissioner had begun tax collection in Gusiiland.
Since the administration insisted that the tax be paid in money, Gusii
1Interview: Mzee Ongaro, 26 May 1968; Morris Oongo, 25 May 1969 .

. 2 Northcote s· diary, 24 November 1907.
I
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men were forced to sell cattle, goats and sheep in order to obtain rupees
with which to pay the tax.

As a result, many Swahili and Somali cattle

traders were drawn to the district.

In early January when Swahili traders

were in Bogeka, they had some money stolen from them by a man named Otenyo.
The traders reported the matter to Northcote who decided to investigate the
charge.

Northcote was taken by some elders to Otenyo's home.

The inhabi-

tants of the adjacent village ran away, and althoughf Northcote called on
them to return, they refused.

After waiting for approximately an hour

for the accused to send him a cow, Northcote took two cows and proceeded
on his journey.
Northcote never completed his journey because he was attacked and
speared.

According to Getutu accounts, when Muraa, who had been released,

saw the Assistant District Commissioner taking the cattle away, she became infuriated.

No doubt remembering the events of November, she began

to insult the young men nearby in very abusive terms.

She told them that

they were just like women -- did not they care that their cattle were being
taken? On hearing this abuse, Otenyo picked up his spear and went off
along the route Northcote was following.

He got ahead of the British of-

ficial and lay waiting for him in the tall grass beside the path along
which Northcote was riding.

As Northcote was passing on his horse, some-

what behing the police detail accompanying him, Otenyo threw his spear at
the official and struck him in the back inflicting a painful but not
fatal wound. 1
1Foran states that Northc6te was riding out to investigate disturbances
that the former had alerted the Assistant District Commissioner about just
prior to the time of the spearing. Foran, p. 338. Northcote's Diary
agrees conclusively with accounts of the event provided by old men in what
is today Bogeka sub-location that the actual sequence of events was as set
out above. Northcote's Diary, 11 January 1908. Interview: P. Omwenga,
25 May 1969; Mzee Ongaro, 26 May 1969. This is only one of the many instances in Foran's account of the 1908 fighting which gives exaggerated
importance to his role in events.
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This spearing of a British administrative officer was of considerable
significance as it touched off open resistance on the part of the Gusii
and led to harsh punitive measures from the British side.
have regarded this incident

Several writers

as the sole manifestation and reason for Gusii

hostility and have pl aced the b1ame on Muraa 1 She is thus seen as having
also
not only produced hostility to British rule but alsohave
to caused the discontent that led to fighting between the Getutu and the British.

News-

paper accounts of the time took this line as well, blaming the resistance
on the "anti-European crusade being persistently preached by tribal
witchdoctors. 2
11

Though perhaps soothing to the imperialist mind, the idea that this
resistance resulted entirely from the evil machinations of a female "witchdoctor," and that because her influence was based on magico-religious
sanctions it was irrational, hardly represents the true picture.

There is

no doubt that Muraa played a considerable part in the spearing of Northcote,
believing perhaps that with his death the British presence would vanish.
Nor can it be doubted that the fact that Muraa was regarded as having
magical powers gave her considerable influence in western Getutu..

Yet,

those interpretations which focus on Muraa, the nature of her influence and
the emotional character of her appeal, nevertheless greatly oversimplify· the
issue, for it is possible to suggest rational and understandable reasons for
her oppositton to the British.

According to some present day elders, she

was motivated by the fear, based on the initial contacts of other Gusii
groups with the British, that the coming of colonial rule would mean an
l

.

For example: Foran, p. 342; W1pper, p. 411; J.A. Hunter and Dan Mannix,
African Bush Adventures (London, 1954), pp. 202-03.

2East African Standard (25 January 1908), p. 11.
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end to her own influence.,

No matter what her own motivations, moreover,

Muraa did not have to invent hostility to the British among the people of
Bogeka.

Antagonism to the British was great as a result of the events of

1905 and what most people considered the arbitrary seizure of cattle on
more than one occasion.

Muraa's incitement of the spearinq served to

touch off armed resistance to British rule, but she did not create the
grievances that caused it.
After the spearing, Northcote was carried back to Kissi by the
police accompanying him, but he was still in great danger.

He took im-

mediate steps to protect the station and to get word to his superiors.
He sent two policemen with news of the attack to provincial headquarters
at Karungu.

Although confined to his bed, Northcote arranged his meagre
forces for the defense of the station. 2
With the spearing of Northcote, there was general rejoicing in
Bogeka at the removal of European rule.
be effectively extended to them.

British authority would not now

The younq men in Bogeka and the sur-

rounding areas of western Getutu took up arms to attack and destroy the
most obvious manifestations of alien domination: Kis3i town and its alien
inhabitants.

When it was learned on the day after the spearing that North-

cote was not dead, large numbers took up arms and set off for Kisii to
attack the town.
This was thus a crucial day for the safety of the station.

Around

noon on January 12th, the Getutu began to mass on the hills surrounding
Kisii.

The bedridden Assistant District Commissioner had already concentrated

1Interview: Paul Nyamweya, 28 May 1969; Erasto Abuqa, 8 July 1969.
2Northcote's Diary, 12 January 1908.
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the forces at his disposal around his house.
a11 who knew how to use a rifle were armed.

Barbed wire was laid down, and
Northcote a1so co 11 ected a11

the women, traders, and servants in Kisii outside his house.
an imposing looking force, but most were unarmed.,

This made

The sight of all

these people, however, was enough to dissuade the forces on the hillside
from attacking.

In 1905 many of them had learned the folly of attacking

a force armed with rifles.

They withdrew from the vicinity of Kisii and

never really threatened it again.
Although an assault was not launched on Kisii, many Getutu found
other targets for their revenge.

The two most important categories of

people selected for Getutu revenge were those whom the colonial system
had introduced into Gusiiland, and secondly, the groups which the British
had protected.

Raids were made on the Luo living in the neighboring

location of Membo. Cattle were stolen, huts burned, and at least two
Luo men killed. 2 This was the kind of activity that Northcote had previously used force to try to stop.

It is significant also that the others

who died as a result of western Getutu taking up arms

two policemen and

an Indian trader -- were brought to Gusiiland by British rule.

These acts

and the spearing itself clearly represented the desire of the people of
western Getutu to resist the inauguration of British rule among them and
to see the alien presence removed from Gusiiland altogether.
Throughout the disputes between the British and the western Getutu,
the other sections of the Gusii remained outside of the fray.

On the

1

Northcote to his father, 12 February 1908, KNA.: DC/KSI/4/1.

2 J.D. Mackay, Report on Operations Against the Rebellious Sections of the
Kisii Tribe (hereafter Mackay's Report), enclosure in Sadler to Elgin,
3 March 1908, C.0. 533/42.
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same day as the threatened attack on Kisii, most of the qovernment appointed chiefs went to the station to pledge their ·loyalty to the
administration. 1 Those members of the western Getutu who were in revolt
against the British seem to have made no attempts to win the allegiance
and support of the other Gusii "tribes.II The attack on Northcote had
not been planned well in advance.

More than likely, those who had

taken up arms never considered joining in a common cause with the other
"tribes" against the British.

In this way both those who joined and

those who abstained from the revolt were obeying the principles of Gusii
tradition: namely that joint action and a united front against a common
enemy were not part of the Gusii political heritage.
Gusii attacks on the Luo and the killing of the policemen and trader
convinced the British that strong punitive action was necessary.

John

Ainsworth, Provincial Commissioner of Kisumu Province and a veteran administrator in the East African Protectorate, received a letter on January
12 from Northcote detailing the spearing.

Because Ainsworth decided that

the problem was limited to a small group, he proceeded to Gusiiland to
investigate the incident with only a small patrol of KAR. 2 On the 14th
he received word of the further raids which he termed "a general rising of
the Kitutu clan against the government." 3 He therefore initiated sterner
measures; the Assistant District Superintendent of Police at Kisumu,
1Northcote's Diary, 12 January 1908.
2John Ainsworth, Report to the P.C. Kisumu to H.E. the Governor on the
Recent Kisii Revolt and its Suppression (hereafter Ainsworth's Report),
enclosure in Sadler to Elgin, 3 March 1908, C. 0. 533/42.
3 Ibid.
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Robert Foran, was sent to Kisii with all available police.

Though he had

only recently returned from Gusiiland, Foran set off the same day with a
force of fifty-two men. 1 Ainsworth also ordered the 5th KAR stationed
at Lumbwa to send fifty men to Kisii.

At the same time, the Provincial

Commissioner wired the Governor tellinq of the further hostilities.

It

was this telegram which led to the dispatch of a full scale punitive
expedition against the Gusii. 2
The government quickly set in motion the steps necessary for the dispatch of an anned force to defeat the Gusii.

A contingent of 327 KAR

with fourteen British officers was sent to Kisumu by train.

On January 22,

the force, which had been augmented by fifty Nandi levies and John Ainsworth
as Chief Political Officer, entered Gusiiland.

The expedition succeeded

in capturing cattle, burning huts and killing anyone who tried to stand
in its

3

way.· 'Even though the Getutu avoided pitched battles, their spears

proved no match for the rifles and machine-guns of their adversary.

By

February 5, when the operation came to a close, the Gusii had suffered cons i derab 1e 1asses.

Two hundred and forty men had been ki 11 ed, over seven

thousand head of cattle were in the hands of the invading force, and another
five thousand sheep and goats had been seized.

During the entire engaqement

1Foran, p. 338. This account· also contains some exaaoeration in the time
it took Foran to make the trip.
2Ainsworth's Renart.
3Northcote thouqht the whole ooeration too severe and ooorlv carried out.
"It would take too long," he later wrote his father, "to describe the
absolute idoicy, obstinacy and want of knowledge of military operations
in this country that they shewed. 11 Northcote to his father, 12 Feb. 1908.
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the British forces suffered no loss of life. 1
The severity of the suppression of the Getutu was justified in
British eyes as necessary to teach the Getutu and in effect the entire
Gusii people a lesson and ensure acceptance of British rule.

After the

end of military activity, Angwenyi, who had not taken up arms against
the colonial government, was made chief of Getutu.

With the appointment

of a single chief for every Gusii tribe, the British settled down to begin a systematic form of administration in all parts of Gusiiland.

With

the punitive expedition clear in the memory of both Getutu and non-Getutu,
there was no open challenge to the colonial authorities. 2
Yet the very harshness and brutality of the KAR left a legacy of
hostility and bitterness among many Gus ii.

Whi 1e armed defiance to

alien rule was obviously out of the question, this did not mean acceptance
of it or acquiescence to the changes it brought.

Given the oroper circum-

stances, many Gusii would demonstrate their opposition in other ways.
In many ways the political, economic and social changes introduced
and brought about by the British in the years before the First World War
tended to keep alive and reinforce feelings of antagonism for British
rule among the Gusii.

Very significant and, in some instances, quite far

reaching alterations were brought about in the lives of the Gusii.

Chanqes

in Gusii institutions were initiated and new patterns of behavior were expected.

While the Gusii did not openly oppose these _innovations, many

disliked the adjustments required of them.

In this way discontent, and no

doubt a longing for a return to the past, continued to be felt by most of
the people.
1Ainsworth's Report.
2 In looking at the causes and courses of the hostilities in both 1905 and
1908, it is impossible to sustain Dr. Wipper's conclusion that "both were
premeditated and planned, determined and persistent on the part of the
Gusii. Wipper, p. 384.
11
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The political and judicial systems that began to function all over
Gusiiland after the suppression of the 1908 resistance were quite different from those existing in colonial times.

The Gusii tribes, with the

exception of the North and South Moriango, each came to fonn the basis
of a new administrative unit.

The chiefs of each of these divisions were

granted more powers and responsibilities than any individual had ever
possessed in pre-colonial times.

The same could be said for the judicial

system that was imposed on the Gusii.

This was especially true in criminal

cases, where the novel concepts introduced by the British reoresented a
radical departure from the pre-colonial pattern.

Consequently, criminal

procedure did not gain wide acceptance among the people.
Some of the social and economic innovations which marked the first
years of colonial rule necessitated new forms of behavior and activity
that were not easily accepted.

Egeserate or cattle villages were abolished

by administrative order in 1912, and Gusii young men, who had traditionally
lived there and guarded their families' cattle, were brought more under control of the elders. 1 Economic changes also caused much dislocation and
difficulty.

The capture of large numbers of cattle by the 1908 expedition

deprived many Getutu of their most important source of wealth.

Despite the

fact that some were returned as payment for road building, most Getutu continued to resent the appropriation of their cattle.

The most distasteful

aspect of the new economic system was the British insistence that able
bodied men should leave home and seek wage paying employment.
1see LeVine and LeVine, p. 29.

However,
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because of Gusii opposition to these demands very few men could be obliged
to obey the new strictures.

It was not until 1913, when the British be-

gan to force men to work away from home, that any substantial .numbers
began to leave the village. 1 , 2·
That the Gusii did not accept European rule wholeheartedly is illustrated further by the Gusii reaction to the coming of Christian missions.
The Roman Catholic Mill Hill Fathers opened a .mission station at Nyabururu
outside Kisii in December 1911. 3 Little interest was shown in what they
had to offer.

In his history of the Mill Hill Fathers, Gale has put the

case most graphically:

"The Bakisi themselves were unfriendly to the

mission because they associated all white men with those who had led the
punitive expedition against them. 114 The Seventh Day Adventists, who beBy the beginning
of World War I, they had not succeeded in making a single convert. 5

gan mission work in 1913, were even less successful.

Most Gusti had not completely reconciled themselves to British rule
and the resulting innovations by the beginning of World War I.

Many still

remembered with bitterness the fighting of 1905 and 1908 and the memory
acted as a deterrent against any direct challenge to the colonial administration.

Yet when the opportunity presented itself, Gusi.i hostility to British

rule would come violently to the surface.
1south Kavirondo 1st Quarterly Report for 1911-12, KNA: DC/KSI/1/1.
2 SKDAR 1913-14, KNA: DC/KSI/1/a.
3or. Wipper is wrong in saying Nyaribari.

Wipper, p. 388.

4 H. P. Gale, Uganda and the Mill Hill Fathers (London, 1959) p. 299.
5 SKDAR 1913-14.
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The German invasion of September 1914 presented the Gusii with
On hearing that the Germans were approaching
1
Kisii, the District Conmissioner and his staff evacuated the station.

just such an opportunity.

In the course of their withdrawal to the lake port of Kendu, they met
three companies of KAR on their way to do battle with the Germans,

Early

on the 12th, the District Commissioner, C. E. Spencer, accompanied the KAR
force back to Kisii which they found occupied by the Germans.

After a

battle which lasted until the early afternoon, both European forces withExcept for a few Indian traders and wounded German
2
soldiers, Kisii was left unoccupied.
drew from the town.

The Gusii now took their opportunity to vent their spleen against
the British.

Large numbers of Gusii from Getutu, Nyaribari and Nchari

entered the town.

They sacked and looted most of the buildings.

The

damage done to the commercial and government buildings, especially the
3
District Commissioner's house, was quite extensive. The Roman Catholic
and Seventh Day Adventist mission stations, previously evacuated, were
looted as well . 4
1Wipper places the date, wrongly, on September 19. Wipper, p. 391.
2Eas t African Standard (19 September 1914), p. 17; W. T. Shorthouse, "The
Battle of Ki s ii , 11 extract from Sport and Adventure in Africa, KNA: DC/ KS I/ 3/ 6.
3 Thehospital was so severely damaged that the Medical Officer from Kisumu
stated after a visit to Kisii that "the Kisii Dispensary no longer exists."
J. Hannigan to Principal Medical Officer, 15 October 1914, KNA: Ministry
of Health, Medical 43/235.
4 SKDAR
1914-15, KNA: DC/KSI/1/2.
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to employ stern punitive measures.

The District .Commissioner ordered all

things taken from Kisii to be returned/

The KAR undertook operations

against the parts of Getutu, Nyaribari and Nchari deemed most responsible.
1
by force.
In addition,
A fine of 10,000 cattle was 1evi ed and co 11 collected
more than sixteen hundred men were sent out to work, after ·being called
into

1Kisii
s11 f or

a baraza. 2

Although this brief uprising clearly indicated Gusii dislike for
3
British rule, later- colonial officials and some scholars 4 have not properly
assessed the ro 1e played by the concrete grievances of the Gusi i as a ·
motive for the sacking of the town.

Rather, they stress the role of ·the

cult of Mumbo (known as Nyamumbo to the Gusii) as motivating ·Gusii resistance
in 1914.

In Dr. Wipper's words.
The sect's existence became patently evident on September 19, ·
1914, when the Germans invaded Kisii from what was then German East Africa and the British vacated the town in order to
mobilize resistance and return. Believing Mumbo's prophecy
that the British would soon depart, the local inhabitants
mistook their temporary exodus for the millenium and looted
the town and the neighboring missions. 5

1w. M. Logan, History of the Wakisii or Abagusti, KNA:
2C. E. Spencer to J. Ainsworth, 30 September 1914, KNA:

DC/KSI/3/2.
PC/NZA. 3/65/47.

Interview: Paul Nyamwega, 28 May 1969.
3see for example: District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 1 August 1928, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2.
4 Wipper, p. 391.
5 Ibid.
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Mumboism seems to have first developed among the Luo of Central
Kavirondo (later Central Nyanza) in 1913.

From there it spread to South

Kavirondo, carried, according to Dr. Wipper, by Seventh Day Adventist
mission adherents.

It rejected European customs, emphasized traditional

mores, and advocated a return to the way of life existing before the
coming of European rule.

It promised the destruction of the colonial

The world was to undergo a great cataclysm at which time a
1
It also
terrible vengeance would befall the enemies of the Mumboites.

order.

promised the coming of a millenium in which the believers in Mumbo would
2 The implication of all this
be blessed with utopian wealth in abundance.
was that the early departure of the British was expected by believers.
Merely because the withdrawal of the British from Kisii seems to fit
in with Mumbo teaching about the departure of the Europeans and the
impending millenium does not provide proof that Mumbo teachings were influential enough in 1914 to cause the looting of the station.

Neither is

the fact that Mumboism won a following in Gusiiland in later years a sufficient reason.

It must be fairly conclusively shown that Mumboism did exist

among the Gusii before September 1914.
There is really no evidence of the existence of Mumboism as a strong
force among the Gusii in September 1914.

There is no contemporary docu-

mentary evidence which would suggest that Mumboism was the cause of this
incident.

1

It is mentioned nowhere in the correspondence regarding the up-

Ibid., p. 397.
2Ibid., p. 398.
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rising in 1914 and 1915.

l

The only piece of evidence that gives the

impression of Mumbo responsibility for the sacking of Kisii is a letter
written by Father Sheffer of the Roman Catholic mission at Asumbi to
the District Commissioner in 1918.

In general very hostile to the cult

of Mumbo, Father Sheffer stated that "Mumbo people were responsible for
'
2
the looting of September 1914. 11 Yet Asumbi lay in Luo country, and the
looting described no doubt refers to the looting of the mission station
by Luo that took place in that month.

In 1914 Father Sheffer had been

in the area for little more than a year, and his contact with Gusii must
have been minimal.

This letter is, in short, extremely inconclusive

proof that Mumboism was responsible for the attack on Kisii in 1914.
In fact, a fairly large amount of evidence indicates that Mumboism
and Mumbo teachings were not involved in the looting at all.

Gusii

elders who remember the sacking of the station unanimously deny that
Mumboism had any part in the events of September 11 and 12. 3 Administration records dating from 1914 and 1915 verify this fact.

In 1915 a

fairly thorough investigation was undertaken of Mumboism in the district.

1For example, see: SKDAR 1914-15; Spencer to Ainsworth, 30 September 1914.
Even in 1918, Ainsworth did not regard Mumboism as threat to peace and order.
In describing his experience with the movement he wrote: 11 I failed to
detect in it any disloyal or harmful tendency and formed the opinion that
to take official notice of the matter was to do more harm than good.'' It
seems certain that he could not have written these words if he had thought
that Mumboism had been responsible for the sack of Kisii.
2 P. Sheffer to District Commissioner, 1 December 1918, KNA: DC/KSI/3/1.
3 Interview
.
nterv1ew:

Paul Nyamwega, 28 May 1969; Eras to Abuga, 27 May 1969.
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The complete reports of this investigation show that it was carried
out only in Luo areas. 1 It seems most unlikely that if the cult were
strong enough in Gusiiland to result in the looting of Kisii, the
administration would not have investigated it there as well.
It is most doubtful that the teachings of Mumbo would have won
such wide acceptance as to promote open hostility by September 1914 .
Mumboism had developed considerable appeal among the Gusii by the end
of the war years as a result of bad economic conditions, forced labor, and
epidemic disease.

What drew those who became involved -in the sect to

Mumboism were these considerations of the real world and not, in most
cases, the religious appeal.

Mumboism had not attracted many devoted

adherents in Gusiiland by the time World War I began.

This is clearly

indicated by a letter of the District Cormnissioner in 1918.
During the year 1914-15, a new religion 'Mumbo' made its
appearance in this district, having its chief attraction
the doctrine that all white men would leave the protectorate . . . Recently the religion made its appearance among
the Kisii and a number of teachers began instructing the
people.
The fact that Mumboism was not involved in the attack on Kisii
in 1914 may also be inferred from an examination of who took part and,
more importantly, who did not take part.

If Mumboism were influential

enough to cause this attack and looting, then it is hard to explain why
only those Gusii 'l iving in the vicinity of the town were involved.

It

1s. H. Fazan, Report on Investigation Made Concerning the Worship of
Mumbo, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2.
2
District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 28 November 1918,
KNA: DC/KSI/3/2. Wipper quotes only the first part of the letter but
not the second sentence. Wipper
pper, p. 891
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is also difficult to reconcile the fact that the Bogonko

"clan" took

little or no part if, as Dr. Wipper maintains, they provided the "core
of support for Mumboism" among the Gusii. 1 Many Bogonko were later
active in what was regarded by the administration as Mumboism 2 , but
in 1914 they were certainly not in the forefront in the rising against the
3
British.
It is thus apparent that the sack of Kisii in September 1914 was
not the result of Mumbo teachings or agitation -- it was the result of Gusii
dissatisfaction with the new ways of colonial rule.

Although British

administration had been in effect for seven years, most Gusii had not
completely reconciled themselves to the new forms of authority.

They

wished to return to the days before the many bothersome controls introduced by the British.

When the administration withdrew from the station,

those Gusii in the vicinity vented their hostility by damaging many of
the buildings and carrying off the contents.

This was a short and rela-

tively uncoordinated attack; it did not_,involve all Gusii by any means,
but it did symbolize Gusii hatred of the alien presence and all it implied
in Gusiiland.
1 Wipper, p. 410.
2oistrict Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 1 August 1928.
3rnterview: Mzee Ongaro, 2 July 1969.
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After taking the form of self defense in 1905, early Gusii
resistance to British rule involved attempts by some of the Getutu to
stop the extension of colonial administration to themselves by removing it from Gusiiland in 1908.

An attempt was made on the life of

the sole British official responsible for administering Gusiiland;
once the attack was made, further attacks were launched against individuals and rules which owed their presence in Gusiiland to British
rule.

A further attack was made on what seemed to be the most obvious

remains of the colonial system following the British withdrawal from
Kisii in 1914.

These two latter instances of armed resistance were the

result, for the most part, not of religious and emotional or irrational
appeals and forces, but of understandable grievances.

First Gusii con-

tacts with the British and their early experiences of colonial rule
produced antagonism among many of the Gusii, and some took up arms and
engaged in hostile acts as a result.
Not all Gusii forcibly opposed the British in 1905, 1908 and 1914,
but these instances of resistance to colonial rule, though they failed
to end the alien presence in Gusiiland, have considerable significance.
Much of the later Gusii response to British rule and its innovations can
be more easily understood against the early background of hostility.
So, too, can the forms which later resistance to European domination took.
The lesson had been clearly driven home that British rule could not
be thrown off by armed force.
European authority.

Some therefore reconciled themselves to

Nevertheless, for others the events of 1905, 1908 and

1914 were not forgotten, nor were the heroes.

They were to serve as

inspiration for the next generation of opponents to colonial rule.
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The Zimbabwe Controversy: A Case of Colonial
Historiography. 1973. 142 pp.

David Chanaiwa

4.00

The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar: A Study
in Political Integration. 1973. 114 pp.

Martin Bailey

4.00

The Pattern of African Decolonization: A New
Interpretation. 1973. Approx. 125 pp.

Warren Weinstein
John J. Grotpeter

4.00

Islamization Among the Upper Pokomo.
1973. Approx. 200 pp.

Robert L. Bunger, Jr.

5.00

Protest Movements in Colonial East Africa: Aspects
of Early African Response to European Rule. 1973.
Approx. 100 pp.

Robert Strayer
Edward I. Steinhart
Robert M. Maxon
Charles H. Lyons
Kenneth J. King
Richard D. Heyman
John M. Trainor
Robert H. Bates

4.00

Martin Legassick

3.00

Western Domination in Africa.

1972.

71 pp.

Education for What? British Policy Versus Local
Initiative. 1973. Approx. 100 pp.
Ethnicity in Contemporary Africa.
60 pp.

1973. Approx.

Class and Nationalism in South African Protest:
The South African Communist Party and the "Native
Repub 1i c": 1928-34. 1973. Approx. 55 pp.

4.00

3.00
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1.

A Bibliography of Malawi.

1965.

2.

A Bibliography on Kenya.

3.

The Guide to the Kenya National Archives.
1969. 452 pp.

1967.

161 pp.

Edward E. Brown
Caro 1 A. Fi s her
John B. Webster

4.50

John B. Webster $ 7.50
Shirin G. Kassam
Robert S. Peckham
Barbara A. Skapa

461 pp.

Robert G. Gregory 12.50
Robert Maxon
Leon Spencer

SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS
1966.

151 pp.

$ 3.00

1.

Basic Structure of Swahili.

2.

Modern Makonde Sculpture Exhibit Catalog
1968.
103 pp.

Aidron Duckworth

3.50

3.

Shindano: Swahili Essays and Other Stories
1971. 55 pp.

Johannes G. Mlela
Jean F. 0 Barr
Alice Grant
Wi 11 i am OI Barr

2.00

James L. Bra i n

1

OCCASIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES
Lucas Kuria
Isis Ragheb
John B. Webster

$ 2.00

A Bibliography on Anthropoloqy and Sociology
in Uganda. 1965. 60 pp.

_Robert Peckham
Isis Ragheb
Aidan Southall
John B. Webster

3.00

4.

A Bibliography on Anthropology and Sociology
in Tanganyika and East Africa. 1966. 91 pp.

Lucas Kuria
John B. Webster

3.00

5.

A Bibliograohy of Bechuanaland.

Paulus Mohome
John B. Webster

3.00

2.

A Bibliography on Politics and Government
in Uganda. 1965. 32 pp.

3.

1966.

58 pp.

A Supplement to a Bibliography of Bechuanaland.
1968. 32 pp. (formerly Occasional Bibliography Paulus Mohome
#12; now combined with #5 and sold as one
John B. Webster
publication.)
Catherine Todd
7.

A Select, Preliminary Bibliography on Urbanism
in Eastern Africa. 1967. 45 pp.

Barbara A. Skapa

2.00

9.

A Bibliography on Lesotho.

Paulus Mohome
John B. Webster

2.00

Paulus Mohome
John B. Webster

2.00

10.

A Bibliography on Swaziland.

1968.
1968.

50 pp.
25 pp.
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11.

A Select Bibliography of Soviet Publications on
Africa in General and East Africa in Particular,
1926-66. 1968. 125 pp.

Ladislav Venys

A Supplement to a Select Biblioqraphy of Soviet
Publications on Africa. Fall, 1968. 25 pp.

Vlasti Venys

A Supplement to a Select Bibliography of Soviet
Publications on Africa. 1969. 21 pp.

Ladislav Venys

A Supplement to a Select Bibliography of Soviet
Publications on Africa. 1970. 17 pp.

Ladislav Venys

$ 5.00

(The three supplements were formerly Occasional
Bibliographies #l4, #l6, and #l?. They are now
included in Occasional Bibliography #11.)

13.

A Supplement to a Bibliograohy of Malawi.
1969. 62 pp.

Paulus Mohome
John B. Webster

3.00

15.

Education in Kenya Before Independence: An
Annotated Bibliography. 1969. 196 pp.

L.A. Martin

4.00

18.

A Guide to the Coast Province Microfilm Collection, Kenya National Archives. Kenya Seyidie
(Coast) Province, Correspondence & Reports,
1891-1962. 1971. 191 pp.

Harvey Soff

4.00

19.

Microfilms Related to Eastern Africa, Part I,
(Kenya). A Guide to Recent Acquisitions of
Syracuse University. 1971. 88 pp.

R.F. Morton
Harvey Soff

3.00

20.

A Supplement to a Select Bibliography of Soviet
Publications on Africa (1970-71). 1972. 27 pp.

Ladislav Venys

2.00

21.

Microfilms Related to Eastern Africa, Part II,
(Kenya, Asian and Miscellaneous). A Guide to
Recent Acquisitions of Syracuse University.
1973. 142 PP.

David Leigh
R.F. Morton

4.00

OCCASIONAL PAPERS
9.

Local Governance and Nation Building in East
Africa - A Functional Analysis. 1963. 35 pp.

Fred G. Burke

16.

The Political Development of Rwanda and Burundi.
1966. 121 pp. (Biblio.)

John B. Webster

4.00

21.

Capital Expenditure and Transitional Planning
in Zambia. 1966. 53 pp.

Gary Gappert

3.00

29.

Settlement Patterns and Rural Development in
Tanganti ka. 1967. 29 pp.

Nikos Georgulas

2.00

$ 2.00
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30.

Two Variables Affectinq Rural Transformation
in Kenya. 1967. 29 pp.

33.

A Social Science Vocabulary of Swahili.
43 pp.

36.

Brack Brown

2.00

James L. Brain

2.00

Public Administration in Africa: The Legacy of
Inherited Colonial Institutions. 1968. 44 pp.

Fred G. Burke

2.00

44.

Measurinq Total Productivity from Kenya
Agricultural Census. 1968 . 22 pp.

James E. Price

2.00

45.

African Policies of the Socialist World: The
Case of East Africa. 1968. 237 pp.

Ladislav Venys

5.00

47.

Papers on the East African Community: a. The
East African Community. b. The Treaty for
East African Cooperation. 1968. 36 pp.

2.00
Donald Rothchild
Anthony H. Rweyemamu

48.

An Inquiry into the Development of Native
Administration in Nyasaland, 1888-1939.
1967. 129 pp.

Timothy Barnekov

4.00

50.

Basic Structure of Swahili, Part II.
1969. 34 pp.

James L. Brain

2.00

51.

A Short Dictionary of Social Science Terms for
Swahili Speakers. 1969. 70 pp.

James L. Brain

3.00

52.

Environment Evaluation and Risk Adjustment
in Eastern Africa. 1969. 53 pp.

James L. Newman,
Editor

3.00

53.

The Pokot of Western Kenya 1910-1963: The
Response of a Conservative People to
Colonial Rule. 1969. 54 pp.

L.D. Patterson

3.00

54.

African Students in the East and West: An
Analysis of Experience and Attitudes.
1970. 63 pp.

Kenneth L. · Baer

3.00

55.

African Politics - A Guide to Research Resources,
Methods and Literature. 1970. 130 pp.

Patrick J. McGowan

4.00

56.

Cross-Cultural Research in Nutrition: A Synopsis
and Guide to Research with Emphasis on Eastern
Africa. 1970. 34 pp.

Marshall H. Segall

2.00

57.

National Liberation and Culture (1970 Eduardo
Mondlane Memorial Lecture) 1970. 15 pp.

Amilcar Cabral

2.50

1968.

PUBLICATIONS MAY BE ORDERED FROM:
Publications

Desk

PROGRAM OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES
SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY
119 COLLEGE PLACE
SYRA'CUSE., NEW YORK 13210

PROGRAM OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES
SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

The Program of Eastern African Studies of the Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs was established in 1962 at Syracuse
University. Its objectives are to encourage and to facilitate social
research on the lands and peoples of an area extending from the horn
of Africa to the southern regions of the continent. The Program
coordinates all academic activities at Syracuse University pertaining
to Eastern Africa, and engages in a variety of projects designed to
assist development in Africa and to spread knowledge of Africa in
the United States. By providing professional and technical assistance,
PEAS also engages in institution-building activities in Eastern
Africa.
The Program has built up the most complete library on Eastern African
materials to be found in North America. The collection includes a
wide range of official and private microfilmed documents from Eastern
Africa.
Research conducted by Program members has resulted in the publication
of fifty-seven Occasional Papers, eighteen Occasional Bibliographies,
three publications in the Eastern African Bibliographic Series, several
special publications, as well as the new Eastern African Studies
series.
Specific information about Program activities may he obtained by
writing to the Director, Program of Eastern African Studies,
119 College Place, Syracuse, New York 13210.

